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Stay Imposed-The Failed Policy of
Section 362(c)(4)
by
Laura B. Bartell*
In the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (BAPCPA)1 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code 2 to modify the
operation of the automatic stay, which in the ordinary course becomes applicable to protect the debtor, the debtor's property and property of the estate
as of the moment a petition is filed.' With respect to a bankruptcy case filed
by someone who has filed a prior bankruptcy case within a relatively short
time before the current filing, a so-called "serial filer,"4 Congress enacted two
new provisions. The first, §362(c)(3),5 terminates the automatic stay, at least
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. My thanks to Beth Applebaum, Sonya
Hubbard and Kathryn Polgar for their assistance on this article.
'Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23
(2005).
211 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006) (the "Bankruptcy Code"). In this article, all statutory citations refer
to the Bankruptcy Code unless otherwise indicated.
II U.S.C. § 362(a).
'A serial filer is "a debtor who abuses the bankruptcy process by filing successive petitions after earlier
petitions are dismissed, repeatedly using the automatic stay to forestall creditors." Spencer Zane Baretz,
Combating the Chapter 13 Serial Filer: An Argument for Orders Containing Prospective Relief from the
Automatic Stay Provision, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1315, 1316 (1997).
sSection 362(c)(3) states:
"(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), (0, and (h) of this section(3) if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a
case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was
pending within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed, other than a case
refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b)(A) the stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with respect to a
debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate
with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case;
(B) on the motion of a party in interest for continuation of the automatic stay and
upon notice and a hearing, the court may extend the stay in particular cases as to
any or all creditors (subject to such conditions or limitations as the court may then
impose) after notice and a hearing completed before the expiration of the 30-day
period only if the party in interest demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in
good faith as to the creditors to be stayed; and
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (B), a case is presumptively filed not in good faith
(but such presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary)-
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to some extent,6 on the 30th day after the filing of a chapter 7, 11 or 13 case
by or against an individual debtor (other than a case filed under chapter 11 or
13 after a chapter 7 case was dismissed under § 707(b)) if that debtor had a
single or joint case pending within the preceding one-year period that was
dismissed.7 The second, § 362(c)(4),8 provides that the automatic stay never
(i) as to all creditors, if(I) more than 1 previous case under any of chapters 7, 11, and 13 in which the
individual was a debtor was pending within the preceding 1-year period;
(II) a previous case under any of chapters 7, 11, and 13 in which the individual was
a debtor was dismissed within such 1-year period, after the debtor failed to(aa) file or amend the petition or other documents as required by this title or the
court without substantial excuse (but mere inadvertence or negligence shall not be
a substantial excuse unless the dismissal was caused by the negligence of the
debtor's attorney);
(bb) provide adequate protection as ordered by the court; or
(cc) perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the court; or
(III) there has not been a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the
debtor since the dismissal of the next most previous case under chapter 7, 11, or 13
or any other reason to conclude that the later case will be concluded(aa) if a case under chapter 7, with a discharge; or
(bb) if a case under chapter 11 or 13, with a confirmed plan that will be fully
performed; and
(ii) as to any creditor that commenced an action under subsection (d) in a previous
case in which the individual was a debtor if, as of the date of dismissal of such case,
that action was still pending or had been resolved by terminating, conditioning, or
limiting the stay as to actions of such creditor; . . . .".
'Courts differ on whether the stay terminates completely, see, e.g., In re Reswick, 446 B.R. 362, 367-73

(9th Cir. B.A.P. 2011); In re Jackola, No. 11-01278, 2011 WL 2518930, at *6-7 (Bankr. D. Hawaii June 22,
2011), or terminates only with respect to the debtor and property of the debtor, see, e.g., In re Taylor, No.

07-31055, 2007 WL 1234932, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2007); In re Tubman, 364 B.R. 574, 584-86
(Bankr. D. Md. 2007); In re Williams, 346 B.R. 361, 370 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006); In re Moon, 339 B.R. 668,
672-73 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 2006); In re Harris, 342 B.R. 274, 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006); In re Johnson,
335 B.R. 805, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2006), or terminates only with respect to actions taken by creditors prior to the current filing, see, e.g., In re Bell, No. 06-11115, 2006 WL 1132907, at *2 (Bankr. D. Colo.

Apr. 27, 2006); In re Paschal, 337 B.R 274, 280 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). See generally Peter E. Meltzer,
Won't You Stay a Little Longer? Rejecting the Majority Interpretationof Bankruptcy Code § 362(c)(3)(A),
86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 407 (2012); Kimberly Lehnert, Termination of the Stay for Successive Filers: Interpreting § 362(c)(3), 29 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 243 (2012); Laura B. Bartell, Staying the Serial Filer - Interpreting the New Exploding Stay Provisionsof § 362(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, 82 AM. BANKR. LJ. 201
(2008); Lisa A. Napoli, The Not-So-Automatic Stay: Legislative Changes to the Automatic Stay in a Case

Filed by or Against an Individual Debtor, 79 AM.
711 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3).
8Section 362(c)(4) provides:

BANKR.

L.J. 749 (2005).

"(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), (f), and (h) of this section(4) (A) (i) ifa single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual
under this title, and if 2 or more single or joint cases of the debtor were pending
within the previous year but were dismissed, other than a case refiled under a
chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b), the stay under
subsection (a) shall not go into effect upon the filing of the later case; and
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goes into effect in a new single or joint bankruptcy case of an individual
debtor if that debtor had two or more single or joint cases pending within the
previous one-year period that were dismissed.
Under § 362(c)(4), on motion of a party in interest brought within thirty
days of the commencement of the latest case, after notice and a hearing,9 the
court may order the stay to take effect only if the party seeking such action
"demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed."o The latest case is presumed not to have been filed in
good faith as to any creditor that sought relief from the stay under § 362(d)
in a previous case of the same debtor if the action for relief was still pending
or was resolved by terminating, conditioning, or limiting the stay as to such
creditor's actions." The latest case is presumed not to have been filed in
good faith as to all creditors if any of three circumstances is established.
(ii) on request of a party in interest, the court shall promptly enter an order confirming that no stay is in effect;
(B) if, within 30 days after the filing of the later case, a party in interest requests
the court may order the stay to take effect in the case as to any or all creditors
(subject to such conditions or limitations as the court may impose), after notice and
a hearing, only if the party in interest demonstrates that the filing of the later case
is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed;
(C) a stay imposed under subparagraph (B) shall be effective on the date of the
entry of the order allowing the stay to go into effect; and
(D) for purposes of subparagraph (B), a case is presumptively filed not in good faith
(but such presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary)(i) as to all creditors if(1) 2 or more previous cases under this title in which the individual was a debtor
were pending within the 1-year period;
(II) a previous case under this title in which the individual was a debtor was dismissed within the time period stated in this paragraph after the debtor failed to file
or amend the petition or other documents as required by this title or the court
without substantial excuse (but mere inadvertence or negligence shall not be substantial excuse unless the dismissal was caused by the negligence of the debtor's
attorney), failed to provide adequate protection as ordered by the court, or failed to
perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the court; or
(Ill) there has not been a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the
debtor since the dismissal of the next most previous case under this title, or any
other reason to conclude that the later case will not be concluded, if a case under
chapter 7, with a discharge, and if a case under chapter 11 or 13, with a confirmed
plan that will be fully performed; or
(ii) as to any creditor that commenced an action under subsection (d) in a previous
case in which the individual was a debtor if, as of the date of dismissal of such case,
such action was still pending or had been resolved by terminating, conditioning, or
limiting the stay as to such action of such creditor."
9

Unlike under the requirements of § 362(c)(3), the hearing on a motion under § 362(c)(4) does not
have to be completed before the expiration of the 30-day period. Compare § 362(c)(3)(B) with
§ 362(c)(4)(B).
'ol U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B).
"11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(ii).
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First, the presumption arises if the debtor had two or more previous bankruptcy cases pending within the one-year period before the current case was
filed.1 2 Second, the presumption arises if a previous bankruptcy case of the
debtor was dismissed within the same one-year period for failure to file or
amend the petition or other required documents without substantial excuse,
failure to provide adequate protection, or failure to perform the terms of a
confirmed plan.13 Third, the presumption arises if "there has not been a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor since the
dismissal of the next most previous [bankruptcy] case" or "any other reason
to conclude that the later case will not be [successfully] concluded."'1 Because § 362(c)(4) applies only if a single or joint case is filed by or against an
individual debtor who had two or more single or joint cases pending within
the previous year that were dismissed,15 the first basis for the presumption
will always be present.1 6 The movant may, however, rebut the presumption
that the case was not filed in good faith "by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary." 17
U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I).
"ll U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(II).
1211

1411 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(III). A chapter 7 case is successfully concluded by a discharge, and a
chapter 11 or 13 case is successfully concluded by a "confirmed plan that will be fully performed." Id.

1511 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i).
16Some courts have applied §

362(c)(4) to debtors who have brought motions under § 362(c)(3) to
extend the stay within 30 days after the filing of the latest bankruptcy case, but have failed to obtain a
hearing on their motions before the expiration of that 30-day period as required by § 362(c)(3)(B). See In

re Williams, No. 10-65839 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2010); In re DiGiovanni, 415 B.R. 120 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 2009); In re Gargani, No. 08-22973 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. May 4, 2008); In re McMillan, No. 08-00240
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2008); In re Arnold, No. 07-80636 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 2008); In re Un.
derbakke, No. 06-00501, 2006 WL 4108578 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2006); In re Gray, No. 05-45793,
2006 BL 17919 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2006); In re Toro-Arcila, 334 B.R. 224 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
Cf In re Williams, No. 08-37433 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009) (denying a motion for reconsideration of
an order denying relief under § 362(c)(3) "to the extent" that it might be deemed to be a request under

§ 362(c)(4)). Because those debtors had only one prior bankruptcy case pending in the one-year period
prior to the current filing, the presumption that the current case was not filed in good faith would not
arise under § 362(c)(4)(D)(i). Most courts find § 362(c)(4) inapplicable under these circumstances. See,
e.g., Capital One Auto Finance v. Cowley, 374 B.R. 601, 608-09 (W.D. Tex. 2006); In re Thornton, No.
07-70002, 2007 WL 7140155, at *1 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); In re Ajaka, 370 B.R. 426, 428 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2007); In re Norman, 346 B.R. 181, 184 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006); Whitaker v. Baxter (In re
Whitaker), 341 B.R. 336, 344 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006). The court in Whitaker nevertheless imposed the
automatic stay using its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105.
1711 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D). "Clear and convincing evidence is that weight of proof which produces in
the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a
clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts of the case." Shafer v. Army & Air
Force Exch. Serv., 376 F.3d 386, 396 (5th Cir.2004), quoted in In re Collins, 335 B.R. 646, 652 n.4 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2005). It "is an intermediate standard that lies between a 'preponderance of the evidence' and
'beyond a reasonable doubt.'" SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. Civ.A.99-CV-4304,
Civ.A.00-CV-4888, Civ.A.01-CV-0159, Civ.A.01-CV-2160, Civ.A.99-CV-2926, Civ.A.00-CV-5953,
Civ.A.02-CV-1484, Civ.A.00-CV-1393, Civ.A.00-CV-6464, Civ.A.01-CV-2602, Civ.A.01-CV-1027,
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The purpose of the amendments to § 362 was to "discourag[e] bad faith
repeat filings."' 8 They have been called "harsh"1 9 and "draconian." 2 0 One
might assume that in most cases a serial filer who falls under the terms of
§ 362(c)(4)-one who has filed at least three cases in a one-year period and
had the prior two dismissed-would be unlikely to be able to rebut the presumption and establish that the most recent case was filed in good faith. But
the facts do not bear out this assumption. As will be discussed below, in the
vast majority of cases filed by a debtor who is subject to § 362(c)(4), if the
debtor moves for imposition of the automatic stay, the court grants the
motion.
Hundreds of § 362(c)(4) motions are made every year. For purposes of
this paper, I have looked only at those cases in which such motions were filed
between March 1, 2014 and March 30, 201421 and in which the court either
granted or denied the motion. 2 2 My research identified one hundred fiftyCiv.A.01-CV-3364, Civ.A.02-CV-8493, Civ.A.01-CV-2981, Civ.A.03-CV-6117, 2005 WL 94167, at *7
n.21 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2005), quoted in In re Boran, No. 07-42460, 2007 WL 7143412, at *2 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Oct. 30, 2007). See also In re Ferguson, 376 B.R. 109, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007).
"The amendments were implemented by Section 302 of Pub. L. No. 109-8, which was entitled "Discouraging bad faith repeat filings," in Title III under the heading "Discouraging Bankruptcy Abuse." Id.
"In re Jumpp, 344 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006).
2
0In re Skoglund, No. 14-90050, 2014 WL 1089865, at *1 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 19, 2014).
21l found these cases by using the Keyword function in searching the dockets available on Bloomberg
Law, Bankruptcy Court Dockets, which includes all filings made on PACER (the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records program). However, I discovered that the Keyword search function on the Bloomberg
site operates only with respect to entries appearing on a docket as of the most recent date on which that
docket was updated on the Bloomberg site. Bloomberg does not routinely update the dockets of chapter 7
or chapter 13 cases after the filing date (although it updates dockets of chapter 11 case monthly). Therefore, with respect to chapter 7 cases, my ability to find relevant cases for this study was limited; I found
only those few chapter 7 cases in which a motion to impose the stay was filed early in the case and
appeared on the docket posted on the Bloomberg Law site. With respect to chapter 13 cases (which make
up the vast majority of cases in which such motions are made), my assistants and I manually updated the
docket of every chapter 13 case filed in March 2014. Therefore, my search should have located every
motion to impose the stay filed in a chapter 13 case during that month. I chose that month because it is
the last month in the last fiscal quarter for which there were reported filing statistics issued by the Federal
Judicial Center when I began my work, which enabled me to compare the total number of cases filed in a
district with the number of cases in which such motions were filed.
221 have not included cases in which the debtor filed a motion seeking imposition of the stay, but
subsequently withdrew the motion, see, e.g., In re Jones-Lewis, No. 14-22782 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17,
2014). Nor have I included cases in which the debtor filed a motion but the court either dismissed the
case without ruling on the motion, see cases cited in note 231 infra, or those cases for which (as of the time
this paper was written) there was no order with respect to the motion (or other indication of the court's
ruling) on the docket, see In re Woods, No. 14-23346 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2014) (motion filed
Apr. 21, 2014); In re Jamerson, No. 14-23279 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (motion filed Mar. 27,
2014); In re Winfrey, No. 14-23103 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (motion filed Mar. 24, 2014); In re
Baskin, No. 14-22390 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014) (motion filed Mar. 6,2014); In re Tuggle, No. 1422303 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2014) (motion filed Mar. 4, 2014).
I have also excluded cases in which a debtor filed a § 362(c)(4) motion, but did not have two prior
cases pending in the preceding year that were dismissed (even if the court purported to grant the motion
under § 362(c)(4), see, e.g., In re Norton, No. 14-90620 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Smith, No.
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two such cases. 2 3 In this article I will look at these cases, examining the
14-90585 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Wilson-Blackwell, No. 14-08755 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 12
2014); In re Richards, No. 14-30320 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2014). I have included cases in which the
court stated that it was granting the motion under § 362(c)(3) or § 105 but there were two prior filings
dismissed in the prior year and therefore the requirements of §362(c)(4) were satisfied.
23
See In re Scullark, No. 14-23392 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Edwards, No. 14-10171
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Farris, No. 14-56451 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014); In re
Anderson, No. 14-23381 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (April Anderson); In re Lawrence, No. 1456443 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Phillips, No. 14-23398 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014);
In re Hammad, No. 14-23414 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-23416 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (Derrick Williams); In re Patterson, No. 14-56594 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31,
2014) (Delana Patterson);In re Egenolf, No. 14-12528 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Souder, No.
14-56389 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2014); In re Natividad, No. 14-51333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 28,
2014); In re Morris, No. 14-11425 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Green, No. 14-41306 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2014) (Lydia Green); In re Shaffer, No. 14-00325 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014);
In re Cox, No. 14-01757 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Dyson, No. 14-23296 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 27, 2014); In re Lester, No. 14-56193 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Moate, No. 14-10410
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Waters, No. 14-56151 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); In re
Griffin, No. 14-56214 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Wilson, No. 14-56203 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar.
27, 2014) (Charles Wilson); In re Horne, No. 14-23266 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Green,
No. 14-23283 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (Samantha Green); In re Robinson, No. 14-23280
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Straw, No. 14-60662 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2014); In re
Poole, No. 14-21170 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Anderson, No. 14-23198 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 26, 2014) (Toni Anderson); In re Ziemer, No. 14-10589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); In re
Wright, No. 14-50726 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Palmer, No. 14-10598 (Bankr. D.N.H. Mar.
26, 2014); In re Smoke, No. 14-51981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2014); In re Watson Cooper, No. 1423188 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Blanchard, No. 14-80966 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2014);
In re Pledger, No. 14-01150 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Brown, No. 14-01687 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2014) (David Brown); In re Gray, No. 14-23169 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar 25, 2014); In
re Bennett, No. 14-23159 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Pugh, No. 14-56026 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
Mar. 25, 2014); In re Dixon, No. 14-01694 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Broome, No. 14-23090
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Jones, No. 14-10552 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2014) (Anthony
Jones); In re Good, No. 14-30957 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-01130 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2014) (James Williams); In re Patterson, No. 14-23111 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24,
2014) (Derrick Patterson);In re Smith, No. 14-23121 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Akitress Smith);
In re Baker, No. 14-23118 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Woods, No. 14-23093 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Demesma, No. 14-23120 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Smith, No.
14-23125 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Dwight Smith); In re Seaborn, No. 14-55914 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Bynum, No. 14-10688 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Brown, No. 1410217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014) (Katina Brown); In re Hartsfield, No. 14-11583 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
Mar. 21, 2014); In re Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Trout, No. 14-10338
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Hoskins, No. 14-02299 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2014); In re
Thomas, No. 14-55799 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2014) (Kelvin Thomas); In re Freeman, No. 14-11189
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Ewing, No. 14-13524 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2014); In re
Johnston, No. 14-51789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2014); In re Gibson, No. 14-22995 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 20, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-23001 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014) (Dorothy Davis); In re
Pirtle, No. 14-22970 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Payne, No. 14-70476 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
Mar. 20, 2014) (Bruce Payne); In re Salem, No. 14-09984 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Williams,
No. 14-55571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2014) (Willie Williams); In re Washington, No. 14-09856 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Richmond, No. 14-22915 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Foster,
No. 14-12020 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Scales, No. 14-22910 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19,
2014); In re James, No. 14-22938 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Cartwright, No. 14-44541
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Thomas, No. 14-50669 (Bankr, M.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2014) (Willie
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chapters under which the cases were filed, where they were filed, the factual
assertions made to support those motions, the varying standards used by the
Thomas); In re Hulbert, No. 14-22881 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Lane, No. 14-22930
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Harris, No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014); In re
Vickers, No. 14-09794 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Garden, No. 14-02057 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar.
18, 2014); In ie Beale, No. 14-11994 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Calvin, No. 14-22860 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Kimbro, No. 14-22864 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Bailey,
No. 14-22883 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Fivecoat, No. 14-41172 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar.
18, 2014); In re Dorsett, No. 14-09732 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Carrick, No. 14-22844
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar, 18, 2014); In re Worrell, No. 14-09428 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2014); In re
Hardy, No. 14-22808 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2014); In re Brown, No. 14-22819 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 17, 2014) (Anita Brown); In re Swafford, No. 14-01207 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2014); In re
Leggett, No. 14-09199 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014); In ie Winters, No. 14-09285 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar.
14, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-22767 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (Sandra Davis); In re Jefferson,
No. 14-22707 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Shorter, No. 14-22696 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
13, 2014); In re Hill, No. 14-22686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (Theresa Hill); In re Marshall, No.
14-22711 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Peterson, No. 14-30779 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 13,
2014); In re Payne, No. 14-10620 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (Darsheka Payne); In re McLaren,
No. 14-01178 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-09104 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 13,
2014) (Senetta Williams); In re Jones, No. 14-22632 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Kimberly Jones);
In re Manning; No. 14-08886 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014); In re Hill, No. 14-22624 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Shondreaka Hill); In re Ivy, No. 14-22645 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014); In re
Greer, No. 14-10462 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 2014); In re Jackson, No. 14-22638 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 12, 2014); In re Thompson, No. 14-22442 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Croswell, No. 1408499 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Saulsberry, No. 14-22565 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11,
2014); In re Hensley, No. 14-40729 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Spears, No. 14-30358 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Dedeaux, No. 14-22600 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Foreman,
No. 14-13732 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014); In ie McNeill, No. 14-01389 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 10,
2014); In re Hall, No.14-10280 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Powell; No. 14-08488 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Vargas, No. 14-15481 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Shannon, No. 1441695 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Holly, No. 14-22337 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 8, 2014); In re
Johnson, No. 14-22489 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Brunson, No. 14-22467 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Branch, No. 14-22437 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Penirian, No.
14-43699 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-22448 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014)
(Candice Davis); In re Dillon, No. 14-11270 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Hardge, No. 14-22471
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Calloway, No. 14-31198 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2014); In Tc
Smith, No. 14-22373 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014) (Lessie Smith); In re Tribble, No. 14-13409
(Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Walker, No. 14-07901 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2014); In ire Adams,
No. 14-22415 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014) (Tony Adams); In ie Ayers, No. 14-22380 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Howard, No. 14-20032 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Cota, No. 1412823 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Allen, No. 14-02484 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014); In re
Perry, No. 14-43465 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2014); In re Smith, No. 14-22315 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 5, 2014) Uessica Smith); In re Golden, No. 14-54566 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2014); In re Butler, No.
14-22330 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014); In ie Grandberry, No. 14-22357 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5,
2014); In ic Wilson, No. 14-01274 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2014) (Melvin Wilson); In re Adams, No. 1430665 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014) (DorisAdams); In re Mensch, No. 14-22324 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 5, 2014); In re Newton, No. 14-10830 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2014); In re Catron, No. 14-10880
(Bankr. D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2014); In re White, No. 14-07623 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2014); In re Brewer,
No. 14-54415 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2014); In ie Loewenstine, No. 14-51281 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 3,
2014); In re Benjamin, No. 14-02338 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014); In re Chantres, No. 14-15043
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-00980 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2014) (Deborah
Williams).
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courts in deciding whether a case was not filed in good faith pursuant to
§ 362(c)(4), and the decisions made on those motions. As described below, I
discovered that § 362(c)(4) is applied almost exclusively in connection with
repeated chapter 13 filings and therefore bankruptcy courts in those jurisdictions in which there are more chapter 13 filings than filings under other chapters see more § 362(c)(4) motions. The jurisdiction that entertains the
largest number of § 362(c)(4) motions by far is the bankruptcy court for the
Western District of Tennessee, 24 and such motions are rarely denied in that
jurisdiction. 2 5
The predominant factual basis for seeking imposition of the stay nationwide is a change in circumstances, either medical or job-related. The most
common reason why courts grant the motion is the failure of creditors or the
trustee to object, and in those rare cases in which the court denied the motion, the most common reason was that a creditor or the trustee filed an
objection to the motion. Regardless of the ruling on the motion, in a large
proportion of those cases in which a motion was made, the case was dismissed or converted before confirmation of a plan, usually due to the debtor's
failure to make required payments. Even before the enactment of § 362(c)(3),
the bankruptcy court had the power to dismiss a bankruptcy case for
"cause,"26 which was consistently interpreted to include a bad faith filing by a
"serial filer." 2 7 Therefore, I suggest that

§

362(c)(4) was an unnecessary

amendment to the Bankruptcy Code because the bankruptcy court already
had effective tools for dealing with the serial filer. I also posit that
§ 362(c)(4) has not accomplished its intended goal-discouraging the serial
filer from filing another bankruptcy case. The data demonstrates that these
amendments to § 362 have failed: they were neither necessary nor effective.
I. IN WHAT CASES AND COURTS DO DEBTORS FILE
MOTIONS TO IMPOSE THE STAY?
Almost all cases in which § 362(c)(4) is triggered, and a debtor files a
motion to impose the stay, are chapter 13 cases. 28 Even debtors who filed a
24

Fifty-nine of the one hundred fifty-two cases in the study were filed in the W.D. Tenn. The jurisdiction with the next highest number of § 362(c)(4) motions was the N.D. Ill. with eighteen cases. See note
34 infra.
25
1n fifty-eight of the fifty-nine cases from the W.D. Tenn., the court granted the motion to impose the
stay.
2611 U.S.C. § 707(a), 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), and 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).
27
See, e.g., Casse v. Key Bank Nat'l Assn. (In re Casse), 198 F.3d 327 (2d Cir. 1999); Eisen v. Curry (In
re Eisen), 14 F.3d 469 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Lee, 467 B.R. 906 (6th Cir. BA.P. 2012); In re Grischkan, 320
B.R. 654 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005); In re Norton, 319 B.R. 671 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005); In re Jones, 289 B.R.
436 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2003).
2
8The only cases in this study that are not chapter 13 cases are cited in notes 29-30 infra.
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§ 362(c)(4) motion in a chapter 11 case 29 or chapter 7 case 3o almost always
had filed at least one prior case under chapter 13.31
The fact that almost all serial filers have filed at least one prior case under
chapter 13 is hardly surprising. The most recent statistics prepared by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts indicate that of the
289,125 chapter 13 cases closed during calendar year 2012, 182,226 (approximately 63%) were dismissed, and 18,892 of the debtors who filed those cases
32
The reafiled another chapter 13 case within six months of the dismissal.
disbeen
have
cases
13
chapter
unsuccessful
of
number
high
the
sons for
33
plans,
13
chapter
and include overly-ambitious
cussed by others,
unanticipated medical problems, job loss or diminution of earnings, divorce,
and other events not foreseeable at the time the chapter 13 plan is confirmed,
that result in the debtor being unable to make the required plan payments.
Given that § 362(c)(4) operates almost exclusively in cases filed by debtors under chapter 13, or after dismissal of one or more chapter 13 cases, it is
also not surprising that courts with higher rates of chapter 13 filings entertain most of the motions to impose the stay. Of the twenty-one districts in
29

See In re Natividad, No. 14-51333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014).
"oSee In re Davis, No. 14-22767 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (Sandra Davis); In re Allen, No.
14-02484 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Loewenstine, No. 14-51281 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 3,
2014).
"See Natividad (two prior chapter 13 cases); Sandra Davis (two prior chapter 13 cases); Loewenstine
(two prior chapter 13 cases). But see Allen (two prior chapter 7 cases before current chapter 7 case).
Although their cases were not filed during the period covered by this study, some debtors who brought
§ 362(c)(4) motions have filed serial chapter 11 cases, see, e.g., In re Davey, 11-11381 (Bankr. D.N.H. Apr.
8, 2011); In re Miller, No. 08-45096 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2008). Some debtors were serial chapter
12 filers, see, e.g., In re Pandol, No. 10-19733 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010); In re Loomis, No. 10-02368
(Bankr. D. Idaho May 20, 2010). One debtor filed two chapter 12 cases, followed by a chapter 11, all
pending in the one-year period, see In re Benefield, No. 10-11077 (Bankr. D.N.M. Mar. 5, 2010).
"See BAPCPA Table 6, "U.S. Bankruptcy Courts-Chapter 13 Individual Debtor Cases With
Predominantly Nonbusiness Debts Closed by Dismissal or Plan Completion During the 12-Month Period
Ending December 31, 2012," Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2012 Report of Statistics
Required by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Washington, D.C.
2013).
"See, e.g., I Rept. of the Nat'l Bankr. Review Comm'n, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
234 (Oct. 20, 1997); David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15
ABI LAW REVIEW 223, 314 (2007); Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 509-531 (2006); Scott F. Norberg, Consumer
Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 439-451 (1999). Calling a chapter 13 plan that does not result in a discharge
"unsuccessful" may be a misnomer. A debtor may obtain significant benefits from filing a chapter 13 case
even when the case does not result in a discharge, such as the benefit of the stay, an opportunity to cure
defaults on home mortgages and auto loans, and an opportunity to exercise financial discipline under the
supervision of a trustee. See generally Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of
Baniruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEx. L. REV. 103, 108-111 (2011); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Consumer Debtors Ten Tears Later: A FinancialComparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 143 (1994).
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which two or more debtors have sought relief under § 362(c)(4) in the cases
in this study, 34 fifteen had a much higher percentage of filings under chapter
13 in the first quarter of 2014 than the national average of 32%.3s The
bankruptcy court for the Western District of Tennessee, which had fifty-nine
cases in the study, has one of the highest chapter 13 filing rates in the nation
(percentage of total bankruptcy filings made under chapter 13).36 It also has
by far the highest rate of filing of § 362(c)(4) motions in its chapter 13 cases
(percentage of chapter 13 cases in which § 362(c)(4) motions are filed); of the
949 chapter 13 cases filed in the district in March 2014 (according to
PACER), fifty-seven of them are included in this study.37 That means that
at least 6% of all chapter 13 cases filed during that month were filed by serial
filers.3 8 By contrast, there were 1343 chapter 13 cases filed in the Northern
District of Georgia during March 2014, and only thirteen debtors made a
§ 362(c)(4) motion that was decided. That is fewer than 1% of all chapter
13 cases in that district.
The one hundred fifty-two motions to impose the stay included in this
study were filed in twenty states, and the bankruptcy courts in the state of
Tennessee accounted for sixty-one of them. The cases included in this study
were dispersed among states as follows:

3 4N.D. Ala. (three cases); E.D. Ark. (two cases); C.D. Cal: (three cases); N.D. Cal. (two cases); M.D.
Fla. (five cases); S.D. Fla. (two cases); N.D. Ga. (fourteen cases); M.D. Ga. (three cases); N.D. Ill. (eighteen

cases); S.D. Ind. (two cases); D. Md. (two cases); E.D. Mich. (three cases); E.D. Mo. (two cases); E.D.N.C.
(five cases); S.D. Ohio (five cases); E.D. Pa. (three cases); W.D. Pa. (three cases); E.D. Tenn. (two cases);
W.D. Tenn. (59 cases); E.D. Tex. (two cases); N.D. Tex. (two cases).

"N.D. Ala. (46%); E.D. Ark. (54%); C.D. Cal (19%); N.D. Cal. (39%); M.D. Fla. (31%); S.D. Fla.
(41%); N.D. Ga. (42%); M.D. Ga. (62%); N.D. Ill. (36%); S.D. Ind. (30%); D. Md. (26%); E.D. Mich. (18%);
E.D. Mo. (38%); E.D.N.C. (68%); S.D. Ohio (29%); E.D. Pa. (41%); W.D. Pa. (44%); E.D. Tenn. (40%);
W.D. Tenn. (71%); E.D. Tex. (52%); and N.D. Tex. (58%). The percentages are derived from Table F-2,
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts-Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy
Code, During the Three-Month Period Ending March 31, 2014, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/2014-bankruptcy-filings.aspx.
"Id. Only the Western District of Louisiana, where chapter 13 filings comprise 77% of all filings in
the first quarter, and the Middle District of Alabama, where chapter 13 filings comprise 76% of all filings
in the first quarter, had a higher chapter 13 filing rate. Id.
"Two of the cases from the W.D. Tenn. included in this study were chapter 7 cases.
"The number is actually higher because some serial filers may not have chosen to file a motion under
362(c)(4), some debtors filed § 362(c)(4) motions that were subsequently withdrawn, some cases were
dismissed before the court ruled on a filed motion, and in some cases the court had not yet ruled on the
motion when this study was conducted. None of those cases were included in this study.
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State
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
New Hampshire
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
West Virginia
Wisconsin
TOTAL

175

Number of Cases in Study
3
2
6
7
17
19
3
2
1
3
1
3
1
5
6
6
61
4
1
1
152

The three states in which debtors filed the largest number of such motions are also states in which chapter 13 filing rates exceeded the national
average of 32% in the first quarter of 2014.'9
II. WHY DO COURTS GRANT OR DENY MOTIONS TO IMPOSE
THE STAY?
Perhaps the most surprising fact one discovers upon an examination of
the motions to impose the stay is that they succeed far more often than they
fail. Of the one hundred fifty-two cases in the study, the court granted the
motion (in whole or in part) in one hundred forty-one of them.40 The natural
"Illinois (34%); Georgia (50%); and Tennessee (52%). These figures are derived from Table F-2, supra
note 35.
40
The cases in which the court denied the motion are In re Green, No. 14-41306 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
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question that a'rises is why the courts do so. Recall that § 362(c)(4) applies
only if the individual debtor in the current case had "2 or more single or joint
cases . . . pending within the previous year but were dismissed."41 A presumption arises that a case is "filed not in good faith"4 2 with respect to all
creditors in every case in which § 362(c)(4) applies because the individual
debtor had "2 or more previous cases under this title in which the individual
was a debtor [ ] pending within the 1-year period."43 This presumption
"may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,"44 meaning a showing that the present case was NOT "filed not in good faith" or, to
remove the double negative, was filed in good faith as to all creditors.45
How does the court determine whether the presumption has been overcome? What leads the court to determine that the current case, at least the
third bankruptcy case involving the same individual debtor pending in the
preceding year, was filed in good faith? In most cases we cannot ascertain the
court's rationale from the available records. Although the bankruptcy judges
may state their reasons on the record at the hearings on the motions, the
written orders granting the motions seldom provide any basis for the decision. We can, however, look at the legal standards employed by those courts
which seek to determine good faith for purposes of § 362(c)(4) when the
court has issued a written opinion setting out its rationale. We can also look
at local forms these courts require petitioners to use when they move for
imposition of the stay. Perhaps most important, we can look at the facts of
these cases to try to ascertain which facts may have been determinative.
A.

LEGAL TESTS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE BAD FAITH

§ 362(c)(4) Is REBUTTED
Very few bankruptcy judges deciding motions to impose the stay under
§ 362(c)(4) have written opinions explaining the legal standard upon which
PRESUMPTION UNDER

Mar. 28, 2014) (Lydia Green); In re Ziemer, No. 14-10589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Brown,

No. 14-10217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014) (Katina Brown); In

re Epstein,

No. 14.10269 (Bankr. N.D.

Ill. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Foster, No. 14-12020 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Garden, No. 14-

02057 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Harris, No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014); In re
Payne, No. 14-10620 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (Darsheka Payne); In re Allen, No. 14-02484
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Cota, No. 14-12823 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014); and In re
Benjamin, No. 14-02338 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014). Only one of these, Darsheka Payne, was filed in
the Western District of Tennessee, where fifty-nine of the cases in this study were filed and fifty-eight
motions to impose the stay were granted. Other bankruptcy courts are more likely to deny such motions.
See C.D. Cal. (denied two of three motions); N.D. Ill. (denied two of eighteen motions).

"1i1 U.S.C.
U.S.C.
311 U.S.C.
4411 U.S.C.
4I2I

45

§ 362(c)(4)(A)(i).
§ 362(c)(4)(D).
§ 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I).
§ 362(c)(4)(D).

This is consistent with the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(4)(B), which allow the court to order the
stay to take effect in cases subject to § 362(c)(4) "only if the party in interest demonstrates that the filing
of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed."
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they relied in concluding that the debtor had, or had not, rebutted the presumption that the current case was filed not in good faith. However, those
who have issued written opinions have cited the more numerous decisions
under § 362(c)(3) in which a similar presumption must be rebutted to extend
46
the automatic stay beyond thirty days after the filing of the current case.
These cases generally fall into one of three categories in their approaches to
good faith-looking at the totality of the circumstances, requiring objective
futility and subjective good faith, or requiring a significant change in the
debtor's circumstances since the last bankruptcy filing.
(1) Totality of the Circumstances. Almost all courts state that the determination of whether the present case has been filed in good faith must be
determined on the basis of the "totality of the circumstances." In interpreting
that phrase, courts employ varying approaches that overlap to a significant
extent. One line of cases employs a multi-factor approach applying the same
factors that would be used were a party in interest bringing a motion to
49
47
or § 1112(b)(1) 48 or § 707(a),
dismiss the case for cause under § 1307(c)
or if the debtor were seeking to satisfy the good faith requirement for confirmation of a chapter 13 case under § 1325(a)(7).50 But courts differ some-

-

46
Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C)(i), a case is presumptively filed not in good faith as to all creditors if
"(I) more than 1 previous case under any of chapters 7, 11, and 13 in which the individual was a debtor
was pending within the preceding 1-year period; (II) a previous case under any of chapters 7, 11, and 13 in
which the individual was a debtor was dismissed within such 1-year period, after the debtor failed to
(aa) file or amend the petition or other documents as required by this title or the court without substantial
excuse (but mere inadvertence or negligence shall not be a substantial excuse unless the dismissal was
caused by the negligence of the debtor's attorney); (bb) provide adequate protection as ordered by the
court; or (cc) perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the court; or (III) there has not been a substantial
change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor since the dismissal of the next most previous case
under chapter 7, 11, or 13 or any other reason to conclude that the later case will be concluded-(aa) if a
case under chapter 7, with a discharge; or (bb) if a case under chapter 11 or 13, with a confirmed plan that

will be fully performed".
41 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (allowing the court to dismiss a chapter 13 case "for cause"). See, e.g., Leavitt v.
Soto (In re Leavitt), 171 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999); Gier v. Farmers State Bank (In re Gier) 986 F.2d

1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1355 (7th Cir. 1992); Coler v. Draper, No. 122020, 2012 WL 5267426, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 23, 2012); In re Prisco, No. 11-00474, 2012 WL 4364311, at
*4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012).
4811 U.S.C.

§

11 12(b)(1) (allowing the court to dismiss a chapter 11 case "for cause"). See, e.g., Carolin

Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 1989); Stingfree Technologies Co. v. Americ Investments
Capital Co. (In re Stingfree Technologies Co.), 427 B.R. 347, 351 (E.D. Pa. 2010); In re Starmark Clinics,
LP, 388 B.R. 729, 736 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
4911 U.S.C. § 707(a) (allowing the court to dismiss a chapter 7 case "for cause"). See, e.g., Piazza v.
Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013); Northern Telecom Corp. v. Siemens Information & Communications Network, Inc., No. 04-8053, 2005 WL

5705113, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2005); In re Hess, 347 B.R. 489, 498 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2006).
5011 U.S.C.

§ 1325(a)(7)

(requiring that "the action of the debtor in filing the petition was in good

faith"). See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 487 B.R. 275, 283 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2013); In re Platt, No. 12-6170, 2012
WL 5842899, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 2012); In re Pearson, No. 10-05166, 2010 WL 5169081, at
*1 (Bankr. D.S.C. Oct. 18, 2010); In re Tomasini, 339 B.R. 773, 783 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006).
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what on what factors should be considered in applying that approach.
For example, in an early chapter 13 case in the Tenth Circuit in which
the bankruptcy court had denied a motion to extend the stay under
§ 362(c)(3),51 the Tenth Circuit applied the seven factors used in analyzing a
motion to dismiss a chapter 13 case. 5 2 The Ninth Circuit used four factors in
determining whether to dismiss a chapter 13 case for bad faith,"5 and some
courts have used the same factors under

§ 362(c)(3)54

and

§

362(c)(4),ss

while other courts in the same circuit have analyzed good faith under
§ 362(c)(3) using the eleven factors used to decide whether a chapter 13 plan
has been proposed in good faith under § 1325(a)(3).5 6 The Eleventh Circuit
has adopted a slightly modified version of these eleven factors for the purpose
of determining whether a chapter 13 plan is proposed in good faith," and
3

"In re Montoya, 333 B.R. 449 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005).
"Those factors, drawn from Gier, include "the nature of the debt, including the question of whether
the debt would be nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding; the timing of the petition; how the debt
arose; the debtor's motive in filing the petition; how the debtor's actions affected creditors; the debtor's
treatment of creditors both before and after the petition was filed; and whether the debtor has been
forthcoming with the bankruptcy court and the creditors." Id. at 457-58, quoting Gier, 986 F.2d at 1329.
Other cases using the Gier factors include In re Galanis, (considering the first, sixth and seventh factors to
be irrelevant to the analysis under § 362(c)(3)).
"The four factors are (1) whether the debtor misrepresented facts in the petition or the plan, unfairly
manipulated the Code or otherwise filed the current chapter 13 plan or petition in an inequitable manner;
(2) debtor's history of filings and dismissals; (3) whether debtor only intended to defeat state court litigation; and (4) whether egregious behavior is present. See Leavitt v. Soto (In re Leavitt), 171 F.3d 1219,
1224 (9th Cir. 1999).
4
5 See, e.g., In re Castaneda, 342 B.R. 90, 96 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2006); In re Montoya, 342 B.R. 312, 317
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2006).
"See, e.g., In re Pandol, No. 10-19733, 2010 WL 9488147, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2010).
3611 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) requires that a chapter 13 "plan has been proposed in good faith and not by
any means forbidden by law" as a condition to confirmation. These factors include (1) the amount of the
proposed payments and the amounts of the debtor's surplus; (2) the debtor's employment history, ability
to earn, and likelihood of future increases in income; (3) the probable or expected duration of the plan; (4)
the accuracy of the plan's statements of the debts, expenses and percentage of repayment of unsecured
debt, and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt to mislead the court; (5) the extent of preferential
treatment between classes of creditors; (6) the extent to which secured claims are modified; (7) the type of
debt sought to be discharged, and whether any such debt is nondischargeable in Chapter 7; (8) the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical expenses; (9) the frequency with which the
debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy Reform Act; (10) the motivation and sincerity of the debtor
in seeking Chapter 13 relief; and (11) the burden which the plan's administration would place upon the
trustee. See In re Warren, 89 BR. 87, 93 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1988). Cases applying these factors to
§ 362(c)(3) motions include In re Pizano, No. 06-52166, 2006 WL 3838723, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec.
16, 2006); In re Resto-Perez, No. 06-52224, 2006 WL 3838242, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2006); In
re Morgan, No. 06-52183, 2006 WL 3838412, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2006).
s"The factors listed by the 11th Circuit are: (1) the amount of the debtor's income from all sources; (2)
the living expenses of the debtor and his dependents; (3) the amount of attorney's fees; (4) the probable or
expected duration of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan; (5) the motivations of the debtor and his sincerity in
seeking relief under the provisions of Chapter 13; (6) the debtor's degree of effort; (7) the debtor's ability
to earn and the likelihood of fluctuation in the debtor's earnings; (8) special circumstances such as inordinate medical expense; (9) the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy
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courts in that circuit have used these modified factors in deciding motions
brought under § 362(c)(3) 58 and § 362(c)(4). 59 When considering motions
under § 362(c)(3) 60 or § 362(c)(4), 6 1 some courts in the Fourth Circuit have
used the multi-factor approach 62 developed for consideration of whether the
plan was proposed in good faith under § 1325(a)(3). 63 In a case involving an
individual chapter 11 filer seeking extension of the stay under § 362(c)(3),
one court 64 applied the factors used in determining whether there is cause to
dismiss a chapter 11 case.6 5 Most courts, however, use the seven factors 66
(or some variation thereof 67) articulated in In re Galanas68 in connection

&

Reform Act and its predecessors; (10) the circumstances under which the debtor has contracted the outstanding debts and demonstrated bona fides, or lack of same, in dealings with creditors; and (11) the
burden which the plan's administration would place on the trustee. Kitchens v. Georgia Railroad Bank

Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 888-89 (11th Cir. 1983).
5
"See, e.g., In re Pullen, No. 07-65415, 2008 WL 2184109, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 23, 2008).
"See, e.g., In re Robinson, No. 05-43319, 2005 WL 6762360, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2005).
"oSee, e.g., In re Taylor, No. 07-31055, 2007 WL 1234932, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2007); In re
Chaney, 362 B.R. 690, 694 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Thomas, 352 B.R 751, 756-57 (Bankr. D.S.C.
2006). Cf. In re Washington, 443 B.R. 389, 395 (D.S.C. 2011) (holding that debtors failed to rebut
presumption under Deans/Neufeld factors or the Galanis factors).

"1See, e.g., In re Hurt, 369 B.R. 274, 280 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007); In re Winters, No. 06-70447, 2006
WL 3392890, at *2-*3 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2006).
"See Deans v. O'Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982). See also Neufeld v.
Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1986) (adding to the Deans factors consideration of debtor's prefiling conduct and possible non-dischargeability (under chapter 7) of the objecting creditors' claims).
6311 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). These factors include "the percentage of proposed repayment, . . . the
debtor's financial situation, the period of time payment will be made, the debtor's employment history and
prospects, the nature and amount of unsecured claims, the debtor's past bankruptcy filings, the debtor's
honesty in representing facts, and any unusual or exceptional problems facing the particular debtor."

Deans, 692 F.2d at 972.
64
McKinnon v. Prime South Bank (In re McKinnon), 378 B.R. 405, 413 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007).
"Those factors, as explicated in Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (In re Phoenix Picca-

dilly, Ltd.), 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir. 1988), include (1) whether the debtor has only one asset,
usually real estate, to which the debtor does not hold legal title; (2) whether the debtor has few unsecured
creditors whose claims are small in relation to the claims of secured creditors; (3) whether the debtor has
few employees; (4) whether the property is the subject of a foreclosure action as a result of arrearages on
the debt; (5) whether the debtor's financial problems involve essentially a dispute between the debtor and
its creditors holding an interest in the real estate which can be resolved in a pending state court action; (6)
whether the timing of the debtor's filing evidences an intent to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of
the debtor's secured creditors to enforce their rights; and (7) whether there is a reasonable possibility of an
effective reorganization of the debtor. Id.
66
The seven factors include (1) the timing of the new petition; (2) how the debt(s) arose; (3) the
debtor's motive in filing another petition; (4) how the debtor's actions affected creditors; (5) why the
debtor's prior case(s) were dismissed; (6) the likelihood that the debtor will have a steady income throughout the bankruptcy case, and will be able to fund a plan; and (7) whether the trustee or creditors object to

the motion. See In re Galanis, 334 BR. 685, 692 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005).
67
The court in In re Carr, 344, B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2006), proposed a slightly modified
version of the Galanis factors. The Carr court considered (1) whether the debtor's present case has "a
reasonable probability of success;" (2) "why the prior case was dismissed;" (3) "what has changed, if anything, in the time between the dismissal of the prior case and the commencement of the current case;" (4)
whether creditors "have [ ] suffered any untoward prejudice due to the lapse of time between the dismis-
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with a § 362(c)(3) motion, as more closely tailored to § 362(c) motions, either in addition to another list of factors 6 9 or (more often) as the exclusive
test for determining if a case was filed not in good faith. 70
(2) Objective Futility and Subjective Good Faith. For some courts, in
deciding whether the presumption has been overcome "the most significant
considerations in evaluating good faith are: (1) why the previous plan failed,
and (2) what has changed so that the present plan is likely to succeed." 7 1
This is often characterized as the "objective futility" standard. 72 If the debtor
cannot establish by clear and convincing evidence that the current case is
likely to end successfully, these courts see no purpose in applying any other
factors to find good faith.7 3 If the court is convinced that the debtor can
sal of the prior case and the filing of the current case;" (5) "how the debts arose and what the debtor's
motivation is for filing bankruptcy;" and (6) "lack of any objection from the trustee or any creditor." Id.

See also In re Barrows, No. 08-61404, 2008 WL 2705519, at *3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. July 9, 2008). The court
in In re Sarafoglou, 345 BR. 19, 24 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006), in considering a § 362(c)(4) motion, reduced
the factors to four: the debtor must "demonstrate that she filed the current case to obtain legitimate
bankruptcy law protection and relief, that she is eligible for such protection and relief, that she has sufficient resources to render her pursuit thereof meaningful, and that she is pursuing such protection and relief
honestly." See also In re DiGiovanni, 415 B.R. 120, 129 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009).

68334 B.R. 685 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005).
6 9See, e.g., In re Pizano, No. 06-52166, 2006 WL 3838723, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2006); In re
Resto-Perez, No. 06-52224, 2006 WL 3838242, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2006); In re Morgan, No.
06-52183, 2006 WL 3838412, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2006); Galanis, 334 B.R. at 685 (considering the seven Calanis factors in addition to the eleven Gier factors from which they were derived).
70
See, e.g., In re Hart, No. 12-21220, 2012 WL 6644703, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 23, 2012); In re

Thompson, No. 10-37075, 2010 WL 4928897, at *2 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 24, 2010); In re Marcello, No.
08-60346, 2008 WL 821542, at *2-*3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008); In re Folger, No. 07-51447, 2007
WL 3046208, at *4-*6 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Oct. 16, 2007); In re Baldassaro, 338 B.R. 178, 188 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 2006); In re Ball, 336 B.R. 268, 274-76 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006); In re Mullins, No. 06-10948
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2006) (Memorandum Opinion on Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

§

362(c)(4) to

Have the Stay Take Effect); In re Hunt, No. 06-500835, 2006 WL 2431554, at *3-*4 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
Aug. 18, 2006); In re Havner, 336 B.R. 98, 103-05 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006). Cf In re Levens, No. 0740052, 2007 WL 609844, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2007) (adding to the seven factors a consideration of "whether the information contained in the Debtor's filings is accurate and whether the Debtor is
complying the obligations imposed by the Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and this

Court's local rules."); In re Winters, No. 06-70447, 2006 WL 3392890, at *4 n.8 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Nov.
22, 2006) (stating that, if the court had applied the seven factors, instead of the Neufeld factors, it would
still have granted the § 362(c)(4) motion).
71

See In re Hall, No. 12-61149, 2012 WL 5356019, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Oct. 30, 2012); In re Sharpe,
No. 07-82868, 2008 WL 544929, at *2 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2008); In re Scarborough, No. 07-15269,
2007 WL 3165544, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2007); In re Elliott-Cook, 357 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2006); see also In re Benefield, 438 B.R. 709, 724 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2010) (requiring a debtor to
"explain why the debtor was unsuccessful previously and why the debtor should not be held responsible
for that lack of success, and why the court should think the debtor will be successful in the current case").
72

See, e.g., Benefield, 438 BR. at 715; In re Jenkins, 435 B.R. 378, 382 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010); In re
Hurt, 369 B.R. 274, 279 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2006); In re Mark, 336 BR. 260, 267 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006).
"See, e.g., Benefield, 438 B.R. at 715 (stating that the debtor must pass the "objective futility" test
before any other factors are considered); Jenkins, 435 BR. at 383 (finding that "objective futility" is a
threshold test); Mark, 336 B.R. at 267-68 (applying "objective futility" test to § 362(c)(3) motion); In re

Charles, 334 BR. 207, 218 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (Charles I) (concluding that objective analysis is a
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propose a successful chapter 13 plan, it may not demand any more to rebut
the presumption. 74
Even if the debtor can make such a showing, other courts may also require an analysis of the debtor's "subjective good faith,"75 meaning whether
the debtor is using (or abusing) the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In
making that determination, these courts will often rely upon factors that bear
on the debtor's state of mind in resorting to bankruptcy.7 6
The objective/subjective good faith analysis is not necessarily entirely
divorced from the totality of the circumstances approach. As one judge has
pointed out,77 all the other factors considered by courts in applying the totality of the circumstances test (and this court identified fourteen separate factors 78 ) can easily be subsumed by either the objective or subjective good faith
analysis.7 9

(3) Change of Circumstances. A third line of cases focuses on the language of § 362(c)(4) itself. Section 362(c)(4)(D)(i) provides that a presumption that the present case was not filed in good faith is created under three
"threshold" test). Cf Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989) (using this test in considering
dismissal of chapter 11 case). But see In re Ferguson, 376 B.R. 109, 125-26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (analyzing subjective good faith before considering objective good faith in connection with § 362(c)(4) motion).
74

See Eastern Savings Bk. v. Toor (In re Toor), 477 B.R. 299, 307-08 (D.Conn. 2012) (affirming holding

of bankruptcy court in imposing stay under § 362(c)(4) based solely on the court's conclusion that debtor
could propose a confirmable plan).
"See, e.g., Jenkins; Mark; Charles I; Carolin.
"Some of the factors considered in determining subjective good faith include the nature of the debtor's
debts, the nature of the collateral (if any) securing such debts, the debtor's eve of bankruptcy purchases,
the debtor's conduct in the present case, the reasons why the debtor wishes to have the stay imposed, and
any other circumstances that bear on the decision to file for bankruptcy protection. See Charles I, 334

B.R. at 219; In re Charles, 335 B.R. 207, 219 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (Charles II). See also In re Collins,
335 B.R. 646, 652-53 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (considering the Charles II factors after considering two
"threshold factors:" (1) the position taken by creditors against whom an extension of the stay is sought;
and (2) the likelihood that the new case will result in a bankruptcy discharge).
""See Ferguson, 376 B.R. at 124.
5
" The factors identified by the court are (1) the timing of the filing of the petition; (2) whether the
debtor truly intends to effectuate a financial rehabilitation; (3) whether the debtor made "eve of bankruptcy" purchases; (4) the accuracy of the information provided by the debtor; (5) the types of debts
sought to be discharged and the circumstances in which they arose (e.g., is the debtor attempting to
protect necessities such as a primary residence or luxuries, such as boat or vacation home); (6) whether the
plan is preferential as to certain creditors; (7) in general, the debtor's treatment of creditors both before
and after the petition was filed; (8) whether the debtor seeks unfairly to manipulate provisions of the
Code; (9) the debtor's conduct in the prior case(s) (e.g., performance of the debtor's duties such as the filing
of schedules and attendance at the meeting of creditors); (10) the frequency with which debtor has sought
bankruptcy relief; (11) the reasons for the dismissal of the debtor's prior case(s); (12) the debtor's earning
capacity and the likelihood that the debtor will have a steady income throughout the bankruptcy case; (13)
the likelihood that the debtor will be able to properly fund a plan; and (14) whether the Trustee or
creditors object to the debtor's motion. Id. at 122-23.
9
" The judge suggested that the factors listed as 1-10 in note 78 supra could be considered in deciding
whether the debtor has subjective good faith in filing the current case, while factors 11-14 bear on objective good faith. Id. at 124 n.27.
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circumstances. The first, that two or more of the debtor's previous bankruptcy cases were pending within the one-year period prior to the current
filing,so will always be present when a debtor files a § 362(c)(4) motion because § 362(c)(4) is applicable only if "2 or more single or joint cases of the
debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed."8
The second basis for creating a presumption of lack of good faith deals
with the circumstances under which the prior cases were dismissed. The
presumption arises if "a previous case under this title in which the individual
was a debtor was dismissed within the time period stated in this paragraph
after the debtor failed to file or amend the petition or other documents as
required by this title or the court without substantial excuse (but mere inadvertence or negligence shall not be substantial excuse unless the dismissal was
caused by the negligence of the debtor's attorney), failed to provide adequate
protection as ordered by the court, or failed to perform the terms of a plan
confirmed by the court." 82 This is purely a factual analysis; either the provi-

sion accurately describes the circumstances under which one or more of the
prior cases was dismissed, or it does not. Most prior cases will have been
chapter 13 cases that were dismissed upon failure to provide required documents or to produce a confirmable plan or to make required payments, and
therefore the presumption will arise under this provision as well. But if the
prior cases were dismissed for other reasons (such as failure to satisfy the
requirements for eligibility for a chapter 13 case, failure to satisfy the prefiling credit counseling requirement, or failure to pay filing fees or make payments prior to confirmation), this may persuade the court that the most recent case was filed in good faith. 3

The third basis for a presumption differs from the other two bases in that
it looks not at historical facts about the debtor's past bankruptcy filings but
rather at the debtor's present and future situation. It states that a presumption arises if "there has not been a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor since the dismissal of the next most previous
case." 84 In addition, there must not be "any other reason to conclude that the

later case will not be [successfully] concluded."8 5
Because the presumption will always arise under the first basis, and perhaps under both of the first two bases, some courts interpret the "change of
so11 U.S.C.

§

362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I).
§ 362(c)(4)(A)(i). But as described in note 16 supra, some courts have applied
§ 362(c)(4) in other circumstances.
8211 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(II).
DSee part II(C) infra.
8411 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(III).
8 5Id. In this context, successful conclusion is defined by receipt of a discharge, in a chapter 7 case, and
a fully-performed plan, in a chapter 11 or chapter 13 case. Id.

8111

U.S.C.
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circumstances" language as a congressional mandate that a debtor show some
change in circumstances in order to rebut the presumption that the current
case was not filed in good faith. For these courts, if the debtor affirmatively
demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, a substantial change in the
debtor's financial or personal affairs since the dismissal of the prior cases, and
the current case is therefore likely to succeed, the presumption is deemed
rebutted (without consideration of any other factors). 6 Many cases addressing motions under § 362(c)(3) 87 and § 362(c)(4)88 follow this approach and
focus solely on whether there has been a change in circumstances since the
previously-filed case in deciding whether the debtor has rebutted the presumption of bad faith.

B.

COURT FORMS DEALING WITH PRESUMPTION OF BAD FAITH
Some bankruptcy courts provide official forms 8 9 to be

completed by debtors seeking imposition of the automatic stay under § 362(c)(4) or provide
"See, e.g., In re Thornes, 386 B.R. 903, 909 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (denying

§ 362(c)(4)

motion be-

cause there was not a substantial change in circumstances); In re Whitaker, 341 BR. 336, 345-46 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 2006) (reimposing stay under § 105(a) when debtor rebutted presumption under § 362(c)(3) by
showing substantial change in circumstances, but motion was filed too late to hold hearing within thirty
days after the bankruptcy filing).
57

See, e.g., In re Magni, No. 10-83270, 2010 WL 5069553, at *2 (Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 7,2010) (denying

§

362(c)(3) motion when debtor's change in circumstances could not be determined because no schedules

or plan had been filed); In re Bosco, No. 10-08000, 2010 WL 4668595, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 9,
2010) (granting extension of stay when debtors "have demonstrated substantial changes in their financial

and personal affairs"); In re Paul, No. 10-10222, 2010 WL 3811955, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 17,
2010) (denying extension of stay under § 362(c)(3) when court "cannot conclude that there has been a
substantial change from the prior case to the present case"); In re Forletta, 397 B.R. 242, 245 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding debtor demonstrated "a substantial change in her personal and financial affairs"
and thereby rebutted the presumption under § 362(c)(3)); In re Graham, No. 08-07229, 2008 WL

4952242, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 2008) (granting extension of stay under

§

362(c)(3) when

"debtor has shown by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial change in his financial

affairs since the dismissal of his previous case"); In re Penland, No. 06-11895, 2006 WL 2089893, at *2
(Bankr. July 21, 2006) (denying motion to extend stay where there was "no clear and convincing evidence
that there had been a substantial change in the financial affairs of the debtor"); In re Campos, No. 06-

80088, 2006 WL 4470841, at *2 (Bankr. Apr. 13, 2006) (granting motion to extend stay when "Debtors'
circumstances have substantially changed since the dismissal of the previous case").
"See cases discussed in part II(C) infra.
89
B-4001-1, Motion to (Extend or Impose) the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)[or
(4)] (Bankr. S.D. Ind. rev. 10/1/12) (hereinafter referred to as "B-4001-1"); F 4001-1.Impose.Stay.Motion
Motion for Order Imposing a Stay or Continuing the Automatic Stay as the Court Deems Appropriate
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012) (hereinafter referred to as "F 4001-1.Impose.Stay.Motion"); Form 721.3, Procedures re Motions to Extend/Impose 11 USC § 362 Automatic Stay Pursuant to § 362(c) or § 362(n)
(Bankr. D. Ore. Rev. 7/18/13) (hereinafter Form 721.3); 2011-3 Standing Order Regarding Motion to
Extend or Impose the Automatic Stay (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Sept. 20, 2011); Standing Order Regarding
Motion to Extend or Impose the Automatic Stay (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2011). The Standing
Orders for the bankruptcy courts for the Northern District of Mississippi and for the Southern District of
Mississippi are identical and are hereafter referred to as "Standing Order." The Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia has a form for motions under § 362(c)(3), but not for motions under
§ 362(c)(4). All forms and standing orders are attached as appendices.
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procedures to do so in their Local Rules.90 The information the court requests by these forms, and requires by these procedures, necessarily indicates
the standards the court applies in determining whether the debtor has overcome the presumption of bad faith.
(1) Southern District of Indiana. The form provided by the bankruptcy
court for the Southern District of Indiana asks the debtor to make two representations. The first is that the debtor or debtors "did not have any prior
case(s) dismissed in the past year for any of the following reasons:
* (failure to file or amend other required documents without
substantial excuse),
* (failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the
Court), or
* (failure to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the
'

Court)." 9

This paragraph is very similar to the language of § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(II),
which states that a presumption that the current bankruptcy case was filed
in bad faith arises when the debtor's prior cases were dismissed under certain
circumstances. 92 However, because the presumption of bad faith will always
arise under § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I) (because the debtor will have had two or
more previous cases pending in the one-year period before the current case
was filed),93 the representation in the form is not necessary to determine
whether or not the presumption arises. Instead, it appears aimed at providing
the debtor the opportunity to establish facts that would, if true, 94 rebut the
"oSome bankruptcy courts also have local rules with respect to § 362(c) motions. See, e.g., L.B.R.
4001-1(h) (Bankr. D. Alaska amended effective Dec. 1, 2011); L.B.R. 4001-2 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. amended
effective Dec. 1, 2009); L.B.R. 4001-5 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. amended effective Dec. 1, 2009). The rules generally provide less guidance about the standards used by the court in deciding such motions than do the
forms, but M.D. Pa. L.B.R. 4001-5 does invite the movant to file "a verified affidavit setting forth the
substantial changes in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor since the dismissal of the next most
previous bankruptcy case," id., ¶ c, which suggests that the court considers that the most relevant factor, if
not the only factor, it considers in rebutting the presumption of bad faith.
9
'B-4001-1, ¶ 4. The form used by the Southern District of Indiana is attached to this article as
Appendix 1.
9211 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(II) provides that the presumption arises if "a previous case under this
title in which the individual was a debtor was dismissed within the time period stated in this paragraph
after the debtor failed to file or amend the petition or other documents as required by this title or the court
without substantialexcuse (but mere inadvertence or negligence shall not be substantial excuse unless the
dismissal was caused by the negligence of the debtor's attorney), failed to provide adequate protection as
ordered by the court, or failed to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the court." (emphasis supplied.)
The three italicized phrases are reflected in the bullet points of the form.
9
3See notes 15-16 supra and related text.
4
9 1n one case in which the debtors used the form, the debtors removed the third bullet point in their
motion, presumably because a prior case was in fact dismissed for failure to perform the terms of the plan.
In re Booker, No. 10-12146 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Aug. 11, 2010) (Motion to Impose the Automatic Stay
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4) entered Aug. 19, 2010).
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presumption.
The second representation included in the form is that "[t]here has been
a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor(s) since
the dismissal of the last case, and the debtor(s) believe(s) that this case will:
* (If a Chapter 7) be concluded with a discharge; or
* (If a Chapter 11 or 13) result in a confirmed plan that will
be fully performed." 9 5
The form requires the debtor to describe the change in circumstances in
an attached affidavit.9 6 This representation is also based on one of the
97
grounds for a presumption of bad faith under § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(III). Because
the presumption will have already arisen under § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I), this representation must be intended to provide the court grounds for concluding
that the presumption of bad faith has been rebutted. This suggests that the
court adopts the approach to rebutting the presumption followed by those
courts using the "change in circumstances" methodology, as discussed
above.98
(2) Central District of California. In the bankruptcy court for the Central District of California, a party seeking imposition of the stay must file a
motion which complies with that District's local rule."9 The standard form

motion (which is used for both

§ 362(c)(3) motions and § 362(c)(4) mo-

00

tions' ) provides four different grounds for imposition the stay, any one or
more of which a debtor may assert by checking a box. The first is that the
case was filed in good faith, and one of three different circumstances exists
10
dealing with specific property subject to a lien or lease:
9 5B-4001-1, t 5.
''Id. In Booker, the debtors failed to attach an affidavit, prompting an objection from their secured
creditor that they failed to establish a change of circumstances. Booker, Amended Objection to the Debtors' Motion to Impose the Automatic Stay, No. 10-12146 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2010). The court

nevertheless granted the motion without explanation. Booker, Order on Debtors' Motion to Impose Automatic Stay Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B), No. 10-12146 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010).
971 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(III) states that the presumption exists if "there has not been a substantial
change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor since the dismissal of the next most previous case
under this title, or any other reason to conclude that the later case will not be concluded, if a case under
chapter 7, with a discharge, and if a case under chapter 11 or 13, with a confirmed plan that will be fully
performed."
"See part II(A)(3) supra.
99L.B.R. 400 1-1(d) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. effective Jan. 2014).
"Sometimes a debtor completing the form gets confused and fills in boxes both in the section dealing
with a motion to extend the stay under § 362(c)(3) and the appropriate section dealing with a motion to
impose the stay under § 362(c)(4). See, e.g., In re Ziemer, No. 14-10589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014)
(motion filed Mar. 26, 2014) (Ziemer Motion); In re Avanzado, No. 10-62201 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 7,
2010) (motion filed Jan, 7, 2011) (Avanzado Motion).
' 0oF 4001-1.Impose.Stay.Motion, 5(a). Another problem that may arise with the form is that counsel for the debtor may check the box saying the case was filed in good faith but fail to check any of the
three boxes below indicating why. See In re Morgan, No. 06-10312 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2006)

1
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(1) the "Property is of consequential value or benefit to the
estate because the fair market value of the Property is
greater than all liens on the property . . .

102

(2) the "Property is of consequential value or benefit to the
estate because the Property is necessary to a reorganization"
for reasons specified by the movant;' 0 or
(3) the "Secured Creditor/Lessor's interest can be ade04
quately protected by" means proposed by the movant.
These factors seem to be derived not from any part of § 362(c) but from
the arguments that debtors frequently make in opposition to a motion for
relief of the stay under § 362(d). They deal respectively with whether the
debtor has equity in the property,10 5 whether the property is necessary to an
effective reorganization,10 6 and whether there is cause for granting relief from
the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
the property.10 7 Consideration of those factors in deciding whether to impose the stay in the first instance (as opposed to whether relief from the stay
is warranted) is not justified under the language of § 362(c)(4) for two reasons. First, § 362(c)(4) requires only a showing that the filing of the current
case was in good faith. Second, it shifts to the debtor the burden on the issue
of the debtor's equity in the property at issue, a burden the statute expressly
confers on the party seeking relief from the stay. 108
The second ground for seeking imposition of the stay under the form used
by the bankruptcy court for the Central District of California is a simple one:
"[t]he present case was filed in good faith notwithstanding that the prior
single or joint cases filed by or against the individual debtor pending within
the year preceding the petition date were dismissed,"1 0 9 either because the
prior dismissal "was of a case not refiled under Chapter 7 after dismissal
(motion filed Mar. 16, 2006) (Morgan Motion). The Central District of California form is attached to this
article as Appendix 2.
2
1" F 4001-1.Impose.Stay.Motion, ¶ 5(a)(1).
""Id. at I 5(a)(2). The most typical way for a debtor to demonstrate satisfaction of this requirement
is to affirm that the property is the debtor's principal residence. See In re Cota, No. 14-12823 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. Mar. 6, 2014) (motion filed Apr. 4, 2014) (Cota Motion); Avanzado Motion; In re Santillan-Santana,
No. 08-16607 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (Motion for Order Imposing a Stay or Continuing the
Automatic Stay as the Court Deems Appropriate, filed Sept. 8, 2008) (Santillan-SantanaMotion). The
property may also be the debtor's car. See Ewing (motion filed Mar. 24, 2014) (Ewing Motion); Cota
Motion.
04
I F 4001-1 Impose Stay Motion, I 5(a)(3).
'0 5See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A).
"o"See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B).
07
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
losSee 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(1).
'0 9F 4001-1 Impose Stay Motion, T 5(b).
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10
under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b),"o
or because "[g]ood faith is shown" for reasons
specified by the debtor.'
This paragraph is completely open-ended, and
provides no guidance as to what factors might be used to establish good faith.
It seems to be intended to implement the provisions of § 362(c)(4)(B), that
provide for a party in interest, in a case in which the automatic stay does not
take effect upon filing of a case, to "demonstrate[ ] that the filing of the later
case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed."112 However, as discussed above,'"1 in all cases subject to § 362(c)(4), a presumption of bad faith
will arise under § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I). Because the form deals separately with
grounds for rebutting the presumption, there is no need for the debtor to
present this separate ground for imposing the stay.
The third ground for imposing the stay against all creditors is the one in
which the bankruptcy court for the Central District of California provides
real guidance about what factors are important to the court in deciding
whether to impose the stay. The form allows the debtor to check a box
stating that "[t]he presumption of a bad faith filing under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(c)(4)(D)(i) is overcome in this case as to all creditors because"11 4 of any
of six possible reasons." 5 One assumes the bankruptcy courts in that District consider these six reasons to be the relevant considerations in determin-

"oThis provision is rather confusing. Under the terms of § 362(c)(4), in determining whether the
debtor had two or more single or joint cases pending in the previous year that were dismissed, thereby
triggering the applicability of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4), any case "refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7
after dismissal under section 707(b)" is not counted. Therefore, if this clause in the form were applicable,
there would be no reason to file the motion to impose the stay because the dismissed case would have no
relevance in analyzing the issue.
"In the Cota Motion, the Ewing Motion, the Ziemer Motion, the Morgan Motion, the Avanzado
Motion, and the Santillan-SantanaMotion, counsel for the debtor checked the box stating that the case
was filed in good faith, but counsel in the Avanzado Motion failed to check either of the following boxes
indicating why. Counsel in the Cora Motion, the Ewing Motion, the Morgan Motion and the SantillanSantana Motion, and the debtor in the Ziemer Motion, all checked the box stating that "[g]ood faith is
shown- and provided additional argument with respect to the alleged good faith.
11211 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B).
"'See notes 15-16 supra and related text.
"'F 4001-1 Impose Stay Motion, ¶ 5(c). The form has a separate provision for those seeking to
impose the stay only against a single secured creditor or lessor in F 4001-IMIS, 1 5(c)(7). In it, the party
seeking to impose the stay is invited to explain why "[t]he presumption of bad faith as to the Secured
Creditor/Lessor under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(ii) is overcome in this case."
"'Counsel in the Santillan-Santana Motion did not check this box at all, relying on the general assertion that the case was filed in good faith made by checking the second box and providing an additional
explanation of the good faith. In fact, the grounds asserted by counsel on behalf of Santillan-Santana
would properly have supported an assertion of changed circumstances. Counsel in the Avanzado Motion
checked the box indicating that the presumption was overcome, but failed to check the box next to any of
the following six reasons, providing instead a one-sentence explanation of why the presumption was overcome, and a declaration of counsel supporting that assertion. In the Cota Motion, the Ewing Motion, the
Morgan Motion, and the Ziemer Motion counsel or the debtor checked both the box stating that the
presumption is overcome, and one or more of the following six boxes.
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ing whether the debtor's current case was filed in good faith. The first four
focus on the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the prior case(s).
* "Debtor had a substantial excuse in failing to file or amend
the petition or other documents as required by the court
or Title 11, resulting in the prior dismissal(s)," and setting
forth what that excuse was;' 1 6
* "Debtor's failure to file or amend the petition or other documents as required by the court or Title 11 and resulting
dismissal was as the result of the negligence of Debtor's
attorney";' 7

* "Debtor's failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the court in the prior case is excusable" for the
reasons described;"" and
* "Debtor's failure to perform the terms of a confirmed plan
9
in the prior case is excusable" for the reasons described."
As was true for the form used by the bankruptcy court in the Southern
District of Indiana, these provisions are all based on the debtor's conduct in a
prior case which serves as the second ground for a presumption of bad faith
that triggers the applicability of § 362(c)(4), but unlike the form used by the
Indiana court, the California form explicitly asks whether debtor's dismissal
20
was due to attorney negligence.1
The fifth listed factor for rebutting the presumption of bad faith in the
California form is that "[t]here has been a substantial change in the personal
or financial affairs of the Debtor since the dismissal of the prior case(s),"
which the debtor is invited to describe, "from which the Court may conclude
that this case, if a case under Chapter 7, may be concluded with a discharge
or, if under Chapter 11 or 13, with a confirmed plan that will be fully performed."121 This language, as is true of the similar language in the form used
by the bankruptcy court in the Southern District of Indiana, is based on the
116

F 4001-1.Impose.Stay.Motion,

¶

5(c)(1). The Cota Motion and Ziemer Motion both relied on this

basis.

'7 Id. t 5(c)(2).

".Id. $ 5(c)(3). The Ziemer Motion relied on this ground.
9
' 1d. I 5(c)(4). The Ewing Motion and Ziemer Motion both had checks in this box.
12011 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(II) provides that the presumption arises if "a previous case under this
title in which the individual was a debtor was dismissed within the time period stated in this paragraph
after the debtor failed to file or amend the petition or other documents as required by this title or the
court without substantial excuse (but mere inadvertence or negligence shall not be substantial excuse
unless the dismissal was caused by the negligence of the debtor's attorney), failed to provide adequate protection as ordered by the court, or failed to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the court." (emphasis
supplied). The italicized phrase provides the basis for the language in the form not included in the form
used by the bankruptcy court in the Southern District of Indiana.
21
1 F 4001-1 Impose Stay Motion, ¶ 5(c)(5). This was one of the bases relied upon in the Ewing
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third ground for a presumption of bad faith under § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(III).' 2 2
The final listed factor invites the debtor seeking imposition of the stay
against all creditors to provide additional reasons why the presumption of
bad faith should be "overcome."12 3 Although the inclusion of this final unstructured invitation to describe a basis for rebutting the presumption of
abuse makes the court's methodology more opaque, the form as a whole indicates that, like the bankruptcy court in Southern District of Indiana, the Central District of California bankruptcy court suggests to debtors that they can
rebut the presumption that the current filing is in bad faith by establishing
that one or both of the two alternative grounds giving rise to the presumption under § 362(c)(4)(D)(i) in the first instance (other than having at least
two cases pending within the prior one-year period) is not present.
(3) District of Oregon. The bankruptcy court for the District of Oregon
has a one-page form setting forth various requirements for motions to impose
the stay. First, it states when motions to impose the stay must be brought
(within thirty days after the order for relief,124 a requirement set forth in
§ 362(c)(4)(B))-1 2 5 It also includes technical information about filing and
serving the motion. 126
Paragraph 2 of the form sets forth the required content of the § 362(c)
motion. The motion is required to specify "(a) the case number, date of filing,
date of dismissal, and reason for dismissal of each of the debtor's bankruptcy
cases that were dismissed within the year prior to the fling of the current
case; (b) specific information as to why the moving party contends the current case was filed in good faith; (c) specific identification of the applicable
presumption(s) that the case is not filed in good faith under . .
§ 362(c)(4)(D); and (d) the basis for moving party's contention that the presumptions should be rebutted."1 27 The motion "must be supported by an
affidavit or declaration,"128 presumably from the debtor, and the "moving
Motion, the Morgan Motion, and the Ziemer Motion for the assertion that the presumption of bad faith
was overcome.
122

See notes 95-96 supra and related text.
F 4001-1 Impose Stay Motion, I 5(c)(6). The Morgan Motion included additional grounds for
rebutting the presumption, including the fact that debtor was facing an imminent foreclosure action on his
home. The Ziemer Motion included language in this section stating that "NOT extending the stay will be
fatal to me and my family of 6. I will be irreparably harmed by NOT being protect (sic] under this BKl 3.
I would NEVER be able to replace this asset and have put in over 400,000 [sic of my own money to
property. This asset is unique and could never be replaced."
123

24

' Form 721.3,

12511 U.S.C.

¶

1(b).

§ 362(c)(4)(B)

allows a party in interest to request the court "within 30 days after the
filing of the later case" to order the stay to take effect.
1

26

Form 721.3,

27

1 Id., ¶2.
1281d.

¶

4. The Oregon form is attached to this article as Appendix 3.
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29
party must be present at the hearing" either in person or by telephone.1
Although the Oregon form is not as structured as the forms in the Southern District of Indiana or the Central District of California, the reference to
the applicable "presumptions" and the invitation to show that "the presumptions should be rebutted"-given that there is only one presumption under
§ 362(c)(4)(D), i.e., that the case is "filed not in good faith"-suggests that
the Oregon bankruptcy court would be inclined to find that the latest case
was filed in good faith under § 362(c)(4) if the debtor can show that the facts
giving rise to a presumption of bad faith under § 362(c)(4)(D)(II) or
§ 362(c)(4)(D)(III) are not present.
(4) Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi. Under the Standing
Order in effect in both of these districts, the courts state that they may grant
motions to impose the stay without conducting a hearing if certain requirements are satisfied. These include the filing of a declaration in support of the
motion, service of the motion and declaration on all parties against whom the
debtor wishes to impose the stay within two days after the petition date, and
the filing of a certificate of service.13 0 The Standing Order states that the
court may grant the motion without conducting a hearing if "a response or
3
objection to the Motion is not timely filed."'1
The form of Declaration in Support of Motion to Impose the Automatic
Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4) ("Declaration") is attached to the
Standing Order, and requires the debtor to identify all previous bankruptcy
32
It then
cases by number, chapter, date of filing, and date of dismissal.1
have
not
repeats the language of § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(II) that the debtor(s) did
"any prior case[s] dismissed in the past year for any of the following reasons:

* failure to file or amend the petition or other required documents without substantial excuse;
* failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the
Court; or
* failure to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the
Court."

33

The Declaration addresses the third standard giving rise to a presumption
that the current case was not filed in good faith in paragraph 7, and asks the
debtor(s) to state that the debtor(s) "have had a substantial change in [my/
29

1 1d.,

¶

5.

1

soStanding Order,

¶1

5.
"'Id., ¶ 6.
13'Declaration,
"'Declaration,

¶
¶

4.
6.

1 and 2. The Mississippi forms are attached to this article as Appendices 4 and
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our] financial or personal affairs since the dismissal of the last case, and [I/
we] believe that this case will:
* [If a Chapter 7] be concluded with a discharge; or
* [If a Chapter 11 or 13] result in a confirmed plan that will
be fully performed."'

3

4

If there have been such changes, the debtor is instructed to describe them
in the following paragraph.13 5 This language is derived from
§ 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(III).
As was true for the forms used in the other districts discussed above, the
declaration indicates that the absence of grounds for the creation of a presumption that the latest case was not filed in good faith under § 362(c)(4)(D)
(other than there having been two prior cases pending in the preceding year)
is sufficient to rebut the presumption.
(5) Western District of Tennessee. The bankruptcy court for the Western District of Tennessee does not provide a form to be used for motions to
impose the stay under § 362(c)(4). However, the debtors in the vast majority of cases in which such motions are filed are represented by one of two
bankruptcy lawyers in Memphis,'3 6 who use what has become a standardized
form for the district (hereafter the "Tennessee Form").' 3 7
The Tennessee Form contains a certification by the debtor, meaning that
the debtor need not file a separate affidavit in support of the motion. It
consists of seven paragraphs. In the first, the debtor lists all prior cases filed
by the debtor which were pending in the preceding year, the date each case
was filed and dismissed, and the reason(s) for the dismissal.' 3
Paragraphs two, five and six of the Tennessee Form are based on the
factors specified in § 362(c)(4)(D) that cause a presumption of abuse to arise.
In the second paragraph, the debtor must state that "the Debtor(s)' financial
or personal affairs have substantially changed since the dismissal of the prior
cases and the Debtor(s) feel(s) they he/she/they can fund and fully perform
his/her/their plan" and specify why the debtor's circumstances have changed
"since the dismissal of the prior cases."' 3 9 This paragraph is similar to the
provisions of § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(III) that create a presumption that the current
case was not filed in good faith if there has not been a "substantial change in
34

1 Declaration, ¶ 7.
"Declaration, $ 8. See In re Newton, No. 14-10830 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2014) (motion filed
Mar. 11, 2014) (identified the substantial changes as "[m]y husband and I are now working").
1' 6 The lawyers are Allen C. Jones and Jimmy E. McElroy.
1 37

See, e.g., In re Horne, No. 14-23266 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (Verified Motion of

Debtor(s) to Impose Automatic Stay Under Section 362(c)(3) [sic] as to All Creditors). A copy of the
Tennessee Form is attached to this article as Appendix 6.
"'sTennessee Form, ¶ 1.
39

' Id.,

¶

2.
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the financial or personal affairs of the debtor since the dismissal of the next
most previous case." 140 However, it differs from statutory provision in that
it allows the debtor to list any changes since all prior cases, not just since the
most recently dismissed case.
The fifth paragraph of the Tennessee Form states that the debtor's "prior
Chapter 13 cases were not dismissed because the Debtor(s) failed to provide
adequate protection ordered by the Court or after the Debtor(s) failed to file
or amend the petition or other documents as required by the Bankruptcy
Code or the Court without substantial excuse."141 This paragraph is derived
from § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I), which creates a presumption of bad faith if a previous case was dismissed "after the debtor failed to file or amend the petition or
other documents as required by this title or the court without substantial
excuse .

.

. failed to provide adequate protection as ordered by the court, or

failed to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the court."1 42 The form
limits the representation to prior chapter 13 cases, although the statute does
not do so. In addition, the Tennessee Form omits the final phrase of the
statutory provision, which creates a presumption of bad faith if the debtor
failed to perform the terms of a confirmed plan, perhaps because almost all
debtors filing the § 362(c)(4) motion had a prior case dismissed either because their chapter 13 plans were not confirmed or they failed to perform the
terms of their confirmed plans.
The sixth paragraph of the Tennessee Form is based on the language in
§ 362(c)(4)(D)(ii) that creates a presumption that the case was not filed in
good faith as to any creditor "that commenced an action under [§ 362(d)] in
a previous case . . . if, as of the date of dismissal of such case, such action was

still pending or had been resolved by terminating, conditioning, or limiting
the stay as to such action of such creditor."14 3 The form states that
"Debtor(s)' prior Chapter 13 cases (choose one: were/were not) dismissed
while an action under Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code was pending or
after such an action had been resolved with an order terminating, conditioning or limiting the stay."' 44 As was true for paragraph 5 of the form, this
U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(III).
"Tennessee Form, t 5.
14211 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(II).
14311 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(ii).
144Tennessee Form, ¶ 6. In many of the filed motions, no selection was made as between "were" and
were not" in this paragraph. See, e.g., In re Scullark,No. 14-23392 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014); In
re Anderson, No. 14-23381 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (April Anderson); In re Dyson, No. 1423296 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Horne, No. 14-23266 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27,
2014); In re Robinson, No. 14-23280 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Green, No. 14-23283
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (Samantha Green); In re Anderson, No. 14-23198 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 26, 2014) (Toni Anderson); In re Demesma, No. 14-23120 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re
Smith, No. 14-23121 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Akitress Smith); In re Davis, No. 14-23001
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014) (Dorothy Davis); In re Pirtle, No. 14-22970 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
14011
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representation is limited to prior chapter 13 cases, although the statute also
creates a presumption if the prior dismissed case was under another chapter
of the Code.
The third and fourth paragraphs of the Tennessee Form set forth the
debtor's total projected monthly income, expenses and net income, and the
proposed plan payment to creditors."'5 These provisions appear to be intended to show that the plan is feasible and is therefore proposed in good
faith.
The Tennessee Form concludes with a representation that the "petition
was filed in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed and the Debtor(s)
believe(s) he/she/they can fully perform the terms of the proposed plan
should it be confirmed by this Honorable Court."' 4 6
The provisions of the Tennessee Form demonstrate that the bankruptcy
courts in the Western District of Tennessee, like those in the Southern District of Indiana and the Central District of California, grant or deny motions
to impose the stay based on their assessment of whether the factors in
§ 362(c)(4)(D) creating a presumption that the current case was not filed in
good faith (other than the provision creating a presumption if two or more
prior cases were pending within the preceding year) are present.

C.

REAL FACTS AND REAL DECISIONS ON MOTIONS TO IMPOSE THE
STAY

Whatever legal standards courts theoretically apply in determining
whether good faith exists for purposes of a motion under § 362(c)(4), their
decisions demonstrate that certain facts are especially likely to motivate them
to grant such motions, and others generally persuade them to deny them. In
this part I will explore some of the commonly recurring facts that debtors
present in § 362(c)(4) motions, which are derived from the decisions of the
bankruptcy courts (when the courts recite the facts in rendering a decision),
20, 2014); In Te James, No. 14-22938 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Richmond, No. 14-22915
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Lane, No. 14-22930 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re
Calvin, No. 14-22860 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Carrick, No. 14-22844 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar, 18, 2014); In re Kimbro, No. 14-22864 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Brown, No.
14-22819 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2014) (Anita Brown); In re Jefferson, No. 14-22707 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Marshall, No. 14-22711 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Hill, No.

14-22624 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Shondreaka Hill); In re Jones, No. 14-22632 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Kimberly Jones); In re Brunson, No. 14-22467 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In

re Hardge, No. 14-22471 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-22448 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014) (Candice Davis); In re Johnson, No. 14-22489 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In

re Adams, No. 14-22415 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014) (Tony Adams); In re Ayers, No. 14-22380
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Smith, No. 14-22373 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014) (Lessie
Smith); In re Grandberry, No. 14-22357 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014).
45

Tennessee Form,

'46Id., T 7.

1

3 and 4.
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from the motions and affidavits filed by the debtors seeking imposition of the
stay, and from any responses to the motions. 147
1. Opposition to the Motion. Creditors rarely file objections to motions
to impose the stay. In only seven cases in this study in which no objection
was made was the motion denied.14 8 The fact most likely to correlate with a
court's decision to grant a motion to impose the stay is the absence of any
objection.
In twenty-six of the cases, a creditor or the trustee filed a written objection to the motion or the court noted that the motion was opposed when
ruling on it or both.14 9 In four of those cases, the court denied the motion.15 0
In twelve of those cases the judge granted the motion with respect to all
creditors other than the objecting creditor."s' Alternatively, in twelve cases
the court ordered, or the debtor and the objecting creditor agreed, that the
stay would be imposed on the objecting creditor, but only so long as the
debtor satisfies certain conditions (such as staying current in his or her payments) and allowing the creditor to obtain relief from the stay or seek dismis147

All quotations come from the verified motions or affidavits filed by the debtors seeking imposition
of the stay.
14
8The cases in which the motion was denied even though no creditor or trustee filed an objection and
neither the docket nor the opinion indicates that any creditor appeared at the hearing on the motion to

object were In re Green, No. 14-41306 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2014) (Lydia Green); In re Brown, No.
14-10217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014) (Katina Brown); In re Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Mar. 21, 2014); In re Foster, No. 14-12020 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Allen, No. 14-02484
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Cota, No. 14-12823 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014); and In re
Benjamin, No. 14-02338 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014).
' 49 See In re Shaffer, No. 14-00325 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Lester, No. 14-56193
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Robinson, No. 14-23280 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re
Anderson, No. 14-23198 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2014) (Toni Anderson); In re Ziemer, No. 14-

10589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Watson Cooper, No. 14-23188 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
26, 2014); In re Bennett, No. 14-23159 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Pugh, No. 14-56026
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Baker, No. 14-23118 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re
Thomas, No. 14-55799 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2014) (Kelvin Thomas); In re Gibson, No. 14-22995
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-55571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2014) (Willie
Williams); In re Cartwright, No. 14-44541 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Hulbert, No. 1422881 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Harris, No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014); In
re Garden, No. 14-02057 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Bailey, No. 14-22883 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 18, 2014); In re Fivecoat, No. 14-41172 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Payne, No. 14-10620
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (Darsheka Payne); In re Adams, No. 14-30665 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
Mar. 5, 2014) (DorisAdams); In re Foreman, No. 14-13732 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014); In re McNeill,

No. 14-01389 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Holly, No. 14-22337 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 8,
2014); In re Penirian, No. 14-43699 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Tribble, No. 14-13409 (Bankr.
D. Md. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Brewer, No. 14-54415 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2014); cf In re Brunson, No.

14-22467 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Dillon, No. 14-11270 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 2014)
(objection was filed and then withdrawn).
"oSee Ziemer; Harris; Garden;Darsheka Payne.
1s'See Shaffer; Robinson; Watson Cooper: Bennett; Baker; Willie Williams; Hulbert; Bailey; Fivecoat;
McNeill; Tribble; Brewer; cf In re Hensley, No. 14-40729 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2014) (court denied
the motion as to creditor who had not filed objection).
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sal if the debtor fails to satisfy the conditions.1 52
The willingness of courts to grant § 362(c)(4) motions merely because no
objection is filed is troubling.15 3 Although the court is authorized to grant a
default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55,154 a court should not enter a
default judgment if the moving party is not entitled to the relief sought as a
matter of law. 55 The language of § 362(c)(4) clearly states that the stay is
to take effect in a case filed by an individual who has had two or more cases
pending in the preceding year "only if the party in interest demonstrates that
the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed."
This requires the movant to overcome the presumption that the latest case
was not filed in good faith "by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary."' 5 6 Debtors seeking imposition of the stay often file motions that fail to
meet the standard set by this statute. Courts should be making an independent judgment of whether the statutory standard for imposition of the stay is
met, even in the absence of an objection. To grant the motion without clear
and convincing evidence that the case is filed in good faith undermines the
objective of Congress in enacting § 362(c)(4)-to deny serial filers the benefits
of the automatic stay unless they carry their burden of establishing circumstances that warrant relief.
2. Change in Financial Status. Most debtors seeking imposition of the
stay had one or more prior chapter 13 cases dismissed because of a payment
default. In thirty-seven of the cases in the study where there was a previous
payment default, the debtor stated that the default was caused by loss of
57 In
employment or a reduction in the hours he or she was able to work.'
'See In re Lester, No. 14-56193 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); Kelvin Thomas; Toni Anderson;
Pugh; Gibson; Cartwright; McNeill; Penirian;Doris Adams; cf. In re Hoskins, No. 14-02299 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Powell; No. 14-08488 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2014) (no filed objection, but
order conditioned on timely payments); Bennett (providing that creditor would not be subject to automatic stay in any new bankruptcy case).
"'As discussed in part II(B)(4) supra, the bankruptcy courts in Mississippi have codified this approach
in their Standing Order.
4
IS Fed. R. Bankr. P. makes Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 applicable in adversary proceedings, and Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 9014(c) makes Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 applicable in contested matters.
'"See, e.g., In re Meyer, 373 BR. 84, 85 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); Lagos v. Monster Painting, Inc., No. 1100331, 2013 WL 5937661, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 5, 2013); In re Davis, No. 09-42865, 2011 WL 1302222,
at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011).
15611 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B) & (D).
'"See In re Scullark, No. 14-23392 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Anderson, No. 14-23381
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (April Anderson); In re Phillips, No. 14-23398 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 31, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-23416 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (Derrick Williams); In re
Patterson, No. 14-56594 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014) (Delana Patterson); In re Cox, No. 14-01757
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Moate, No. 14-10410 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); In re
Robinson, No. 14-23280 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Straw, No. 14-60662 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio Mar. 26, 2014); In re Anderson, No. 14-23198 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2014) (Toni Anderson);
In re Patterson, No. 14-23111 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Derrick Patterson);In re Baker, No. 1423118 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Seaborn, No. 14-55914 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2014);
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twenty-two of those cases, the debtor argued in favor of the motion by stating that the debtor (or one of the parties who were helping to support the
debtor) now has a new job, 58 or a change in the hours or income in connection with an old job, and the debtor is therefore able to perform the current
plan.' 59
Some debtors support their assertion that there has been a change in
circumstances by stating they are now receiving (although not necessarily for
the first time) unemployment or other public benefits 6o or child support,' 6 1
In re Brown, No. 14-10217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014) (Katina Brown); In re Johnston, No. 14-51789
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2014); In re Pirtle, No. 14-22970 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014); In re
Harris, No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Vickers, No. 14-09794 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar.
18, 2014); In re Calvin, No. 14-22860 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Kimbro, No. 14-22864
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Leggett, No. 14-09199 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014); In re
Davis, No. 14-22767 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (Sandra Davis); In re Jefferson, No. 14-22707
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Hill, No. 14-22686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (Theresa
Hill); In re Marshall, No. 14-22711 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Manning; No. 14-08886
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014); In re Ivy, No. 14-22645 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014); In re
Croswell, No. 14-08499 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014); IIn re Hall, No.14-10280 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar.
10, 2014); In re Shannon, No. 14-41695 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Brunson, No. 14-22467
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Smith, No. 14-22373 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014) (Lessie
Smith); In re Adams, No. 14-22415 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014) (Tony Adams); In re Butler, No. 1422330 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014); In re Wilson, No. 14-01274 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2014)
(Melvin Wilson); In re Loewenstine, No. 14-51281 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2014); In re Chantres, No.
14-15043 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014).
"'See Delana Patterson;In re Egenolf, No. 14-12528 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Cox, No.
14-01757 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2014); Moate; In re Straw, No. 14-60662 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 26,
2014); Toni Anderson; In re Brown, No. 14-01687 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2014) (David Brown); In re
Jones, No. 14-10552 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2014) (Anthony Jones); Derrick Patterson;Seaborn; In re
Payne, No. 14-70476 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2014) (Bruce Payne); In re Calvin, No. 14-22860 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Kimbro, No. 14-22864 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Ivy,
No. 14-22645 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014); In re Jackson, No. 14-22638 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
12, 2014); Croswell; In re McNeill, No. 14-01389 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Holly, No. 1422337 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 8, 2014); In re Mensch, No. 14-22324 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014);
Butler; Brunson; Chantres; cf Sandra Davis (one or more prior cases dismissed because debtor lost job, but
motion does not indicate that debtor has new job); Shannon (prior case dismissed because debtor lost job,
and is now "activily [sic] looking for work"); In re Saulsberry, No. 14-22565 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11,
2014) (debtor is "looking for new employment"); In re Smith, No. 14-22315 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5,
2014) (Jessica Smith) ("seeking employment").
1s9 See In re Lawrence, No. 14-56443 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-23416
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (Derrick Williams); In re Morris, No. 14-11425 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar.
28, 2014); In re Wilson, No. 14-56203 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014) (Charles Wilson); In re Green, No.
14-23283 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (Samantha Green); In re Good, No. 14-30957 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio Mar. 24, 2014); In re Scales, No. 14-22910 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Lane, No. 1422930 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Harris, No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014); In
re Hill, No. 14-22686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (Theresa Hill); In re Manning; No. 14-08886
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014); In re Hill, No. 14-22624 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Shondreaka
Hill); In re Ayers, No. 14-22 380 (Bahkr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014); Hall; cf. In re Edwards, No. 14-10171
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014) (stating that debtor has obtained "additional income").
60
' See In re Horne, No. 14-23266 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); Samantha Green; In re Hoskins,
No. 14-02299 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-23001 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20,
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or are "gainfully employed" or "self-employed."1 62 Some say that there has
been a substantial change in their financial or personal affairs, but do not
specify what that change is, 1 63 or do not indicate that there has been any
change.1 64 Although this changed circumstances argument bears on whether
there is a presumption of lack of good faith under § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(III), it
seems to be used by the bankruptcy judges in considering whether the debtor
has overcome the presumption (already created because there were two or
more cases pending in the preceding year165 ) by clear and convincing evidence. In all but one of the cases where the debtor mentioned new employment, increased hours of employment, or receipt of public benefits, the
66
bankruptcy judge granted the motion to impose the stay.1
In many instances the debtor stated that the debtor's prior difficulties
were attributable to the fact the debtor (or someone related to the debtor)
was suffering from medical conditions in the past which interfered with the
debtor's ability to make plan payments, to file required papers, or to appear in
court (often because the debtor was required to take time off from work or
incurred unexpected costs). Of the debtors in the cases in the study, thirtyfive mentioned past physical or mental medical conditions (including preg68
nancy or birth of a child,1 6 7 or death of a loved one1 ) in the documents they

2014) (Dorothy Davis); Johnston; Bruce Payne; In re Cartwright, No. 14-44541 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar.
19, 2014); In re Carrick, No. 14-22844 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar, 18, 2014); Jefferson; In re Peterson, No.

14-30779 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2014); In re Johnson, No. 14-22489 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7,
2014); In re Branch, No. 14-22437 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-22448 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014) (Candice Davis); In re Hardge, No. 14-22471 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7,
2014); Tony Adams; Melvin Wilson; Mensch; cf. In re Thomas, No. 14-50669 (Bankr, M.D. Ga. Mar. 19,
2014) (Willie Thomas) (social security benefits that had been reduced were now restored); Robinson
(debtor stated that "there is a hearing pending the reinstatement of her sisters [sic] SSI.
6

6' See In re Broome, No. 14-23090 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014).

62
1 See Scullark; April Anderson; In re Smith, No. 14-23121 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Akitress Smith); Pirtle; Baker; In re Richmond, No. 14-22915 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Jones,
No. 14-22632 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Kimberly Jones); Ayers; Brunson.

' 65See In re Poole, No. 14-21170 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-00980
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2014) (Deborah Williams).
164See In re Farris, No. 14-56451 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Souder, No. 14-56389 (Bankr.

N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2014); In re Griffin, No. 14-56214 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Smoke, No.
14-51981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-01130 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 24,
2014) (James Williams); In re Smith, No. 14-23125 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Dwight Smith); In
re Brown, No. 14-10217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014) (Katina Brown); In re Hartsfield, No. 14-11583

(Bankr. E.D. Ark. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-55571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2014) (Willie
Williams); In re Bailey, No. 14-22883 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re McLaren, No. 14-01178

(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Greer, No. 14-10462 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 2014); In re
Spears, No. 14-30358 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Cota, No. 14-12823 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2014); In re Golden, No. 14-54566 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2014); In re Catron, No. 14-10880 (Bankr. D.
Mass. Mar. 4, 2014); In re Brewer, No. 14-54415 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2014).
165
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I).
' 66See In re Harris, No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014).
' 67See In re Pledger, No. 14-01150 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Hardge, No. 14-22471
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filed with their motions. 169 Two debtors mentioned automobile accidents.1 70
Notable changes in the debtor's medical condition swayed the court in all but
two cases.1 71
Other changes in the debtor's finances described in the filings include
surrender of a vehiclel 72 or of real property, 7 3 a loan modification,1 7 4 or some
other reduction in expenses,17 5 and financial assistance from a family member
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Smith, No. 14-22315 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014) (Jessica
Smith).
168See In re Watson Cooper, No. 14-23188 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Thomas, No. 1455799 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2014) (Kelvin Thomas); In re Carrick, No. 14-22844 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar, 18, 2014).
`9See Farris;In re Anderson, No. 14-23381 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (April Anderson); In
re Dyson, No. 14-23296 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Waters, No. 14-56151 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
Mar. 27, 2014); In re Horne, No. 14-23266 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Green, No. 14-23283
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (Samantha Green); In re Robinson, No. 14-23280 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 27, 2014); In re Ziemer, No. 14-10589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Watson Cooper, No.
14-23188 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Pledger, No. 14-01150 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 25,
2014); In re Bennett, No. 14-23159 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Demesma, No. 14-23120
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Bynum, No. 14-10688 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2014);
Kelvin Thomas; In re Freeman, No. 14-11189 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Pirtle, No. 1422970 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Salem, No. 14-09984 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014); In
re Scales, No. 14-22910 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Cartwright, No. 14-44541 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Lane, No. 14-22930 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Vickers, No.
14-09794 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Saulsberry, No. 14-22565 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11,
2014); In re Hensley, No. 14-40729 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2014); Carrick; In re McNeill, No. 1401389 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Hall, No.14-10280 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2014); In re
Vargas, No. 14-15481 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2014); In ye Penirian, No. 14-43699 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
Mar. 7, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-22448 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014) (Candice Davis); In re
Hardge, No. 14-22471 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Tribble, No. 14-13409 (Bankr. D. Md.
Mar. 6, 2014); In re Adams, No. 14-30665 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014) (DorisAdams);JessicaSmith;
In re Benjamin, No. 14-02338 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014); In re Chantres, No. 14-15043 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. Mar. 3, 2014).
' 7oSee In re James, No. 14-22938 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); Freeman.
71
' See Ziemer Benjamin.
72
1 See In re Hammad, No. 14-23414 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Palmer, No. 14-10598
(Bankr. D.N.H. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Patterson, No. 14-23111 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Derrick Patterson);James; In re Grandberry, No. 14-22357 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014); In re Wilson,
No. 14-01274 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2014) (Melvin Wilson).
1"See In re Edwards, No. 14-10171 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Good, No. 14-30957
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2014); In re Dedeaux, No. 14-22600 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2014); In re
Holly, No. 14-22337 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 8, 2014). Cf In re Wright, No. 14-50726 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
Mar. 26, 2014) (proposed to surrender home if unable to obtain loan modification).
74
1 See In re Dixon, No. 14-01694 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Payne, No. 14-10620 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (Darsheka Payne); In re Dillon, No. 14-11270 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 2014);
In re Smith, No. 14-22373 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014) (Lessie Smith); In re Howard, No. 14-20032
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2014); cf In re Shannon, No. 14-41695 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2014); Wright
(seeking loan modification).
'"See In re Brown, No. 14-01687 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2014) (David Brown); In re Broome, No.
14-23090 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Woods, No. 14-23093 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24,
2014); In re Seaborn, No. 14-55914 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Ewing, No. 14-13524 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Washington, No. 14-09856 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Hardy,
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or friend.1 76 In only two cases in which the debtor described this type of
change in the debtor's financial circumstances did the court deny the
motion.1 77
3. Eligibility. In one case in the study, 178 one of the prior cases was
dismissed not because of a payment default or a failure to fulfill the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, but because the debtor was not eligible for
filing under chapter 13 pursuant to § 109(e).1 79 There the court granted the
motion to impose the stay. Courts have consistently granted motions to impose the stay under these circumstances.1 80
In six other cases in the study in which debtors made § 362(c)(4) motions,181 the debtor stated that the court dismissed one or more of the prior
cases because the debtor failed to satisfy the mandatory prefiling credit counseling requirement of § 109(h).' 8 2 In four of these cases, the debtor's motion
to impose the stay was granted. 8 3
No. 14-22808 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2014); In re Foreman, No. 14-13732 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 11,
2014); In re McNeill, No. 14-01389 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Branch, No. 14-22437 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014).
' 76See In re Phillips, No. 14-23398 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Green, No. 14-41306
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2014) (Lydia Green); In re Demesma, No. 14-23120 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
24, 2014); Dixon; Palmer; Hammad; In re Beale, No. 14-11994 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2014); In re
Swafford, No. 14-01207 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2014); In re Jefferson, No. 14-22707 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Ivy, No. 14-22645 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014).
177See Lydia Green; Darsheka Payne.
17sSee In re Natividad, No. 14-51333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014).

"

1791 U.S.C. 109(e) limits chapter 13 to individuals "with regular income that owe[ ], on the date of
the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated unsecured debts of less than $360,474 and noncontingent, liquidated secured debts of less than $1,081,400 ....
1soSee, e.g., In re Abrahim, No. 14-30161 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2014); In re Fuina, No. 08-10206
(Bankr. D.NJ Jan. 6, 2008); In re Blake, No. 07-12445 (Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 20, 2007); cf In re Edmondson, No. 14-13616 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014) (granting stay on an interim basis, and then case was
dismissed prior to final decision on motion).

""1See In re Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Foster, No. 14-12020 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Foreman, No. 14.13732 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014); Beale; In re Calloway, No. 14-31198 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Catron, No. 14-10880 (Bankr. D. Mass. Mar. 4,
2014). This is not an unusual problem for debtors filing § 362(c)(4) motions. See, e.g., In re Carpenter, No.

13-50305, 2013 WL 1194865 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2013); In re Castillo, No. 12-15265 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. Jun 12, 2012); In re Cavalier, No. 10-11214 (Bankr. M.D. La. Aug. 6, 2010); In re Massenburg, No.

10-35442 (Bankr. E.D.Va. Aug. 5, 2010); In re Benefield, No. 10-11077 (Bankr. D.N.M. Mar. 5, 2010); In
re DiGiovanni, 415 B.R. 120, 125 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009); In re Beal, No. 08-10357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 15,
2008); In re Ferguson, 376 B.R. 109 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Stronk, No. 07-00170 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
Jan. 9, 2007); In re Coons, No., 06-71580 (Bankr. Nov. 6, 2006); In re Schroeder, 356 B.R. 812 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2006); In re Ortiz, 355 B.R. 587 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
18211 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) states that generally -an individual may not be a debtor under this title
unless such individual has, during the 180-day prior ending on the date of filing of the petition by such
individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency . . an individual or
group briefing . . . that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related budget analysis."
'"See In re Beale, No. 14-11994 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2014); Catron; Calloway; Forman. But see
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Judicial sympathy for debtors who have been unable to navigate the eligibility requirements of the Bankruptcy Code is not surprising. Perhaps the
courts conclude that when a debtor erroneously files a case under a chapter
for which the debtor is not eligible, those cases should not "count" towards
the determination of whether the debtor is a serial filer. More fundamentally, a debtor who files a case for which the debtor is not eligible and then
dismisses it does not seem to be abusing the bankruptcy process, and it would
be unjust to punish the debtor by denying him or her the benefit of the
automatic stay when the debtor later files a new case under the proper chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
4. Bad Lawyers and No Lawyers. Often the debtor (or the lawyer filing
the motion on behalf of the debtor) describes some problem in the prior case
(or cases) that arose because the debtor lacked adequate representation. In
thirteen cases, the debtor filed one or more of the prior cases pro se, but
obtained representation in connection with the current case. 184 In eight
cases, the debtor was represented by a lawyer in the prior cases, but stated
that the previous lawyer did something wrong' 85 and a new lawyer has now
been retained. 186 The court granted the motion in all but three cases in
which the debtor made the "new lawyer" argument.187 This suggests that
courts view a new, competent lawyer (or the firing of the prior, incompetent
Epstein; Foster. In one of the cases in which the court denied the motion, the debtor was a pro se filer, see
Foster. Courts are unlikely to grant § 362(c)(4) motions filed by pro se filers. See part II(C)(4) infra.
4
18 See In re Natividad, No. 14-51333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Shaffer, No. 14-00325
(Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Jones, No. 14-10552 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2014) (Anthony
Jones); Epstein; In re Salem, No. 14-09984 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Garden, No. 14-02057
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Dorsett, No. 14-09732 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2014); In re
Winters, No. 14-09285 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014); In re Manning; No. 14-08886 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.

Mar. 12, 2014); In re Croswell, No. 14-08499 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Foreman, No. 14-

13732 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Tribble, No. 14-13409 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 6, 2014); In re
White, No. 14-07623 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2014).
"'Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(II), a presumption that the current case was filed not in good
faith is created when a previous case was dismissed within the prior year "after the debtor failed to file or
amend the petition or other documents as required by this title or the court without substantial excuse
If the dismissal was caused by "the negligence of the debtor's attorney," "substantial excuse" is
established. Id. Because the presumption of lack of good faith has already been established under 11
U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(i)(I), the negligence of the previous attorney is intended to convince the court that
there has been a change of circumstances making successful completion of the newly-filed case more likely.

'86See In re Blanchard, No. 14-80966 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Gray, No. 14-23169
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar 25, 2014); In re Trout, No. 14-10338 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2014); In re

Worrell, No. 14-09428 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2014); In re Spears, No. 14-30358 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Mar.
11, 2014); In re Allen, No. 14-02484 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Perry, No. 14-43465 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2014); In re Newton, No. 14-10830 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2014); cf. In re
Fivecoat, No. 14-41172 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (lawyer representing debtor in prior case acknowledge mistake leading to dismissal of prior case).

's 7The argument failed in In re Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014); Garden; and
Allen.
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one) as the sort of change in circumstances that may help the debtor rebut
the presumption that the case was filed not in good faith.
By contrast, in three cases the debtor filed the current case (as well as one
or more of the prior cases) pro se,' 88 and the court denied the motion in all of
them.189

5. Imminent Foreclosure or Seizure of a Vehicle. One of the principal
reasons debtors file for bankruptcy is to save their homes or cars from a
scheduled foreclosure sale.' 90 This remains true when the debtor files for
bankruptcy for the second or third time. Of the one hundred fifty-two cases
in the study, thirty-five of the debtors indicated in connection with their
motions that they were in critical need of the automatic stay to prevent sale
of their home or other real property,191 seizure or sale of their vehicle,1 92 or
both.' 9 3
This argument cuts both ways with judges considering whether to impose the stay. On the one hand, the loss of real property or a car will probably render the newly-filed case meaningless. On the other hand, use of
repeated bankruptcies solely to stave off a lawful foreclosure reeks of abuse,
and when the court sees no other reason for the current case, as in seven
"'See In re Ziemer, No. 14-10589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Brown, No. 14-10217
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014) (Katina Brown); In re Foster, No. 14-12020 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 19,
2014).
"This result is consistent with that of many prior pro se filers of § 362(c)(4) motions. See, e.g., In re
Carpenter, No. 13-50305 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 13, 2013); In re Cameron, No. 13-10115 (Bankr. D.R.I.
Nov. 12, 2012); In re Henneghan, No. 11-00673 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011); In re Benefield, No. 1011077 (Bankr. D.N.M. Mar. 5, 2010); In re Leonard, No. 09-32725 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. May 15, 2009).
"oSee, e.g., Porter, supra note 33, 90 TEX. L. REv. at 141; Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once is Not Enough:
Preserving Consumers' Rights to Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L. J. 455, 495 (1999).
"'9SeeIn re Farris, No. 14-56451 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Egenolf, No. 14-12528 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Natividad, No. 14-51333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Waters,
No. 14-56151 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Wilson, No. 14-56203 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27,
2014) (Charles Wilson); In re Ziemer, No. 14-10589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); Blanchard; In Te
Palmer, No. 14-10598 (Bankr. D.N.H. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Brown, No. 14-01687 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar.
25, 2014) (David Brown); In re Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Hoskins, No.
14-02299 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2014); Foster; In re Garden, No. 14-02057 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 18,
2014); In re Beale, No. 14-11994 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2014); Fivecoat; In re Hensley, No. 14-40729
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Spears, No. 14-30358 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014); In re
Foreman, No. 14-13732 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Hall, No.14-10280 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar.
10, 2014); In re Vargas, No. 14-15481 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Tribble, No. 14-13409
(Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 6, 2014); Allen; Newton.
192See In re Lawrence, No. 14-56443 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Pugh, No. 14-56026
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Thomas, No. 14-55799 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2014) (Kelvin
Thomas); In re Harris, No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014); In re McLaren, No. 14-01178
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Brewer, No. 14-54415 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2014); Ewing.
"3 See In re Edwards, No. 14-10171 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Souder, No. 14-56389
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2014); In re Williams, No. 14-55571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2014) (Willie
Williams); In re Cota, No. 14-12823 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Chantres, No. 14-15043 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014).
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1 94
cases in the study, the court is likely to deny the motion for stay.
6. Failure to Pay, File Papers, or Appear. Most of the prior cases of a
§ 362(c)(4) filer are dismissed for failure to make required payments under a
chapter 13 plan (either before or after confirmation), and although the reason
is usually inadequate income to fund a plan, some debtors had problems they
95
believed they had resolved since their last bankruptcy case filing.s In
twenty-eight cases1 96 the debtor stated that one or more of the prior cases

1 94 See, e.g., Ziemer; Epstein; In re Foster, No. 14-12020 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Harris,
No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014); Garden; Cota; In re Allen, No. 14-02484 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
Mar. 6, 2014); cf In re Fivecoat, No. 14-41172 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Hensley, No. 1440729 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Hensley, No. 14-40729 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2014)
(denying stay as to creditor holding mortgage on real property).
"'The explanations for failure to make payments include loss or change of job or temporary layoff or
reduction in hours, see cases cited in note 157 supra;medical problems, see cases cited in note 169 supra;
unexpected expenses relating to motor vehicles or a home, see In re Ewing, No. 14-13524 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
Mar. 20, 2014); In re Hulbert, No. 14-22881 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Hardy, No. 1422808 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2014); In re Leggett, No. 14-09199 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014);
In re Jefferson, No. 14-22707 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Ivy, No. 14-22645 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014); In re Thompson, No. 14-22442 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Powell; No.
14-08488 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Johnson, No. 14-22489 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014);
loss of lease resulting in unexpected moving expenses, see In re Vickers, No. 14-09794 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Mar. 18, 2014); Leggett; debtor "was unemployed and had fines and fees to pay to keep from having her
driver's license revoked," see In re Branch, No. 14-22437 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); "payments
were deducted from her payroll but the wrong amount was deducted" or "her employer sent the payments
to the wrong trustee," see In re Brown, No. 14-22819 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2014) (Anita Brown);
"he was having memory problems due to having a stroke and did not remember to make his payments," see
In re Demesma, No. 14-23120 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); divorce or separation, see In re Green,
No. 14-41306 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2014) (Lydia Green); In re Pledger, No. 14-01150 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Howard, No. 14-20032 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2014); Pugh; In re Loewenstine, No. 14-51281 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2014); "Debtor's vehicle was stolen and she had no transportation," see Pledger; "Debtor, through no fault of her own, incurred a financial hardship," see In re
Swafford, No. 14-01207 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2014); "daughter's grants for college were denied and
Debtor had to provide her with funds for books and other necessities," see In re Washington, No. 14-09856
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2014); "Debtor's wife was supposed to be making the payments but failed to do
so," see In re Shaffer, No. 14-00325 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014); "unforeseen business expenses
and the funds in the Debtor's bank account were not available to satisfy the full amount when the Debtor
attempted to make an online payment," see In re Smoke, No. 14-51981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2014);
"incurred a financial hardship," see In re Williams, No. 14-00980 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2014) (Deborah
Williams); "misunderstanding" with respect to employer deduction orders, see In re Griffin, No. 14-56214
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); payment to trustee was lost in the mail, see Brewer; "payments (2) were
destroyed in the mail truck fire" and "sent the payments to the wrong Trustee," see In re Bailey, No. 1422883 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); debtor had to "help her grandson with legal expenses," see
Hardy.
6
19 See In re Anderson, No. 14-23381 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (April Anderson); Edwards;
Natividad; In re Morris, No. 14-11425 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2014); Shaffer; In re Lester, No. 14-56193
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); Ziemer; In re Blanchard, No. 14-80966 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2014);
In re Gray, No. 14-23169 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar 25, 2014); In re Brown, No. 14-10217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Mar. 21, 2014) (Katina Brown); In re Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Trout,
No. 14-10338 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Salem, No. 14-09984 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 20,
2014); Hulbert; In re Garden, No. 14-02057 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Dorsett, No. 14-09732
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-22767 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (Sandra
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was dismissed because the debtor failed to file a plan or other documents
required to be filed at the beginning of a bankruptcy case. 197 In fourteen
cases,1 98 the debtor stated that he or she had failed to appear for the meeting

§ 341(a)

of creditors under

or the confirmation hearing in a prior case,' 99 for

reasons including debtor's failure to receive notice of the court date, 200 or
inability to take time off from work. 20 1 In only six of the cases in which
debtor failed to file all required documents or appear in a prior case did the
court deny a motion to impose the stay.202
7. Untimely

§ 362(c)(3) Motion. As discussed previously, 20 3

Some

courts have entertained motions under § 362(c)(4) by debtors who had only
one prior case pending in the preceding one-year period, but who failed to
satisfy the timing requirements of § 362(c)(3). 20 4 However, most courts do
Davis); In re Winters, No. 14-09285 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014); In re Croswell, No. 14-08499
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014); Spears; In re Foreman, No. 14-13732 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014);
Vargas; Tribble; In re Walker, No. 14-07901 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2014); Cota; Allen; In re Perry, No.
14-43465 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2014); In re Newton, No. 14-10830 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Mar. 4,
2014).
7

" 1n a chapter 13 case, the chapter 13 plan must be filed with the petition or within 14 days thereafter (subject to extension for cause). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3015(b). The chapter 13 debtor is also required
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1308(a) to file certain prepetition tax returns not later than the day before the
first scheduled meeting of creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 34 1(a). All debtors are required to file the informa-

tion required by 11 U.S.C.

§ 521(a)(1)

and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(a)(1) and (b). If an individual debtor in

a voluntary case under chapter 7 or chapter 13 fails to file the information required by § 521(a)(1) within
45 days after the filing of the petition, the case is automatically dismissed on the next day (unless the court

orders otherwise). 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1).
19
sSee In re Davis, No. 14-23001 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014) (Dorothy Davis); Pledger; Gray;
Demesma; Salem; In re Richmond, No. 14-22915 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Williams, No.

14-09104 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2014) (Senetta Williams); In re Jones, No. 14-22632 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Kimberly Jones); In re Hill, No. 14-22624 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014)
(Shondreaka Hill); In re Jackson, No. 14-22638 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014); Hensley; Perry;
Newton; In re White, No. 14-07623 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2014).
99

' The debtor is required to 'appear and submit to examination under oath at the meeting of creditors
under section 341(a)." 11 U.S.C. § 343.
2
O"See Richmond; Kimberly Jones; Shondreaka Hill; Newton.
20
See Senetta Williams; In re Hensley, No. 14-40729 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2014); White.
2 2
0. See In re Ziemer, No. 14-10589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Brown, No. 14-10217

(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014) (Katina Brown); In re Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21,
2014); In re Garden, No. 14-02057 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Cota, No. 14-12823 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Allen, No. 14-02484 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014). The change in circumstances identified in the motions with respect to the debtor's former failure to appear or debtor's former
failure to make payments tend to be somewhat self-serving. See, e.g., In re Edwards, No. 14-10171 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014) ('Debtor is [now] aware of processing time for wage directives and will monitor
her paychecks closely . . . to ensure that all trustee payments are received in full by the due date each
month"); Richmond (stating that debtor now knows "the importance of coming to court"); In re Woods,

No. 14-23093 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Demesma, No. 14-23120 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 24, 2014); In re Shorter, No. 14-22696 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (debtor now knows that
payments need to be made "in a timely manner" or "on time each and every month").
20 3

See note 16 supra.

2 04

Under

§

362(c)(3), a debtor seeking to continue the operation of the automatic stay beyond 30 days
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not allow § 362(c)(4) motions under those circumstances, so the debtors in
the cases in which they have missed the thirty-day window for filing a
§ 362(c)(3) motion simply dismiss the case and then file another, seeking imposition of the stay under § 362(c)(4). In the two cases included in this
study in which the debtor sought imposition of the stay under these circumstances, the motion was successful. 20 5
8. True Serial Filers. Although § 362(c)(4) is triggered only when the
debtor had at least two prior cases pending within the one-year period prior
to the filing of the current case, in eighty-eight of the cases in the study an
examination of the docket sheets and petitions indicates that the debtor had
more than two prior bankruptcy cases, but not necessarily more than two
cases pending in the prior year. 20 6 Indeed, in one case, the current case was
after the filing date of the latest case is required to bring a motion and convince the court to order the
continuation after notice and hearing completed during the 30-day period. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B).
2 05See In re Vargas, No. 14-15481 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Walker, No. 14-07901
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2014).
206See In re Scullark, No. 14-23392 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Edwards, No. 14-10171 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Farris, No. 14-56451
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Anderson, No. 14-23381 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 31, 2014) (April Anderson) (seven prior cases); In re Lawrence, No. 14-56443 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar.
31, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Phillips, No. 14-23398 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (four prior
cases); In re Williams, No. 14-23416 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (Derrick Williams) (four prior
cases); In re Natividad, No. 14-51333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) (one prior joint case, one prior
individual case for each filer); In re Morris, No. 14-11425 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2014) (four prior
cases); In re Shaffer, No. 14-00325 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014) (four prior cases); In re Dyson, No.
14-23296 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (ten prior cases); In re Moate, No. 14-10410 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. Mar. 27, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Wilson, No. 14-56203 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014)
(Charles Wilson) (three prior cases); In re Horne, No. 14-23266 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (five
prior cases); In re Green, No. 14-23283 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (Samantha Green) (four prior
cases); In re Robinson, No. 14-23280 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Straw,
No. 14-60662 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Poole, No. 14-21170 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Anderson, No. 14-23198 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26,
2014) (Toni Anderson) (five prior cases); In re Palmer, No. 14-10598 (Bankr. D.N.H. Mar. 26, 2014) (five
prior cases); In re Blanchard, No. 14-80966 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2014) (three prior cases); In re
Pledger, No. 14-01150 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2014) (six prior cases); In re Gray, No. 14-23169 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Mar 25, 2014) (nine prior cases); In re Pugh, No. 14-56026 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2014)
(five prior cases); In re Broome, No. 14-23090 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (five prior cases); In re
Jones, No. 14-10552 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2014) (Anthony Jones) (nine prior cases); In re Good, No.
14-30957 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Williams, No. 14-01130 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. Mar. 24, 2014) (James Williams) (seven prior cases); In re Smith, No. 14-23121 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 24, 2014) (Akitress Smith) (five prior cases); In re Woods, No. 14-23093 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
24, 2014) (seven prior cases); In re Demesma, No. 14-23120 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (six prior
cases); In re Smith, No. 14-23125 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Dwight Smith) (three prior cases);
In re Brown, No. 14-10217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014) (Katina Brown) (three prior cases); In re
Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Freeman, No. 14-11189
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Ewing, No. 14-13524 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 20,
2014) (thirteen prior cases); In re Gibson, No. 14-22995 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014) (three prior
cases); In re Davis, No. 14-23001 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014) (Dorothy Davis) (nine prior cases); In
re Pirtle, No. 14-22970 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014) (four prior cases); In re Williams, No. 14-
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the debtor's thirteenth bankruptcy filing in ten years. 207 Another debtor had
six prior cases pending in the preceding year. 208 One might assume that these
true serial filers would be unlikely to receive a favorable ruling on a motion to
impose the stay, but in fact only five of these motions (out of eighty-eight)
were denied. 209
Perhaps in some of those cases the court did know of the number of prior
filings by the debtors. Although debtors are required to disclose "All Prior
55571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 19,2014) (Willie Williams) (four prior cases); In re Richmond, No. 14-22915
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014) (eight prior cases); In re Scales, No. 14-22910 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 19, 2014) (four prior cases); In re James, No. 14-22938 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014) (three
prior cases); In re Cartwright, No. 14-44541 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2014) (four prior cases); In re
Lane, No. 14-22930 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014) (seven prior cases); In re Foster, No. 14-12020
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2014) (four prior cases); In re Harris, No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18,
2014) (eleven prior cases); In re Vickers, No. 14-09794 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2014) (three prior cases);
In re Garden, No. 14-02057 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Beale, No. 14-11994
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2014) (four prior cases); In re Calvin, No. 14-22860 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18,
2014) (eight prior cases); In re Bailey, No. 14-22883 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014) (five prior cases);
In re Carrick, No. 14-22844 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar, 18, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Worrell, No. 14-

09428 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2014) (four prior cases); In re Hardy, No. 14-22808 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 17, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Brown, No. 14-22819 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2014) (Anita
Brown) (five prior cases); In re Leggett, No. 14-09199 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014) (three prior cases);
In re Davis, No. 14-22767 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (Sandra Davis) (seven prior cases); In re
Jefferson, No. 14-22707 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (nine prior cases); In re Shorter, No. 14-22696
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014) (four prior cases); In re Hill, No. 14-22686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
13, 2014) (Theresa Hill) (three prior cases); In re McLaren, No. 14-01178 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 13,

2014) (five prior cases); In re Williams, No. 14-09104 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2014) (Senetta Williams)
(three prior cases); In re Jones, No. 14-22632 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Kimberly Jones) (six
prior cases); In re Jackson, No. 14-22638 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (six prior cases); In re Ivy,

No. 14-22645 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Hill, No. 14-22624 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Shondreaka Hill) (three prior cases); In re Saulsberry, No. 14-22565 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 11, 2014) (eleven prior cases); In re Spears, No. 14-30358 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014)
(eight prior cases in three different districts); In re Foreman, No. 14-13732 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014)
(four prior cases); In re Powell; No. 14-08488 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2014) (seven prior cases); In re
Shannon, No. 14-41695 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Holly, No. 14-22337
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 8, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Johnson, No. 14-22489 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
7, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Brunson, No. 14-22467 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014) (six prior cases);
In re Dillon, No. 14-11270 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Davis, No. 14-22448
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014) (Candice Davis) (three prior cases); In re Calloway, No. 14-31198
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2014) (four prior cases); In re Smith, No. 14-22373 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6,

2014) (Lessie Smith) (nine prior cases); In re Tribble, No. 14-13409 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 6, 2014) (four
prior cases); In re Ayers, No. 14-22380 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014) (four prior cases); In re Smith,
No. 14-22315 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014) Uessica Smith) (three prior cases); In re Butler, No. 14-

22330 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Grandberry, No. 14-22357 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014) (five prior cases); In re Mensch, No. 14-22324 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014)
(three prior cases); In re Newton, No. 14-10830 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2014) (three prior cases); In re
Brewer, No. 14-54415 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2014) (three prior cases); In re Chantres, No. 14-15043
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014) (three prior cases).
07
2 See In re Branch, No. 14-22437 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014).
20aSee Gray.
209
See Katina Brown; Epstein; Foster; Harris; Garden.
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Bankruptcy Cases Filed Within Last 8 Years" in a voluntary petition in a
bankruptcy case, 2 10 not all do so. 2 1 1 In some cases the clerk searches the
dockets under the debtor's name and enters on the docket in the most recent
case a notation disclosing the prior filings, 2 12 but there is no jurisdiction in
which the clerk is required to do so and it does not appear that any clerk has
a practice of doing so in every case. When a bankruptcy judge explicitly
mentions the number of prior filings (more than two) in ruling on the motion,
the judge is likely to deny the motion. 2 13 In most cases, however, the court
was probably aware of the prior filings, and concluded that the number of
prior filings was irrelevant in determining whether the debtor rebutted the
presumption of lack of good faith in the current case. The Bankruptcy Code
2 10

Official Form 1, Voluntary Petition. The form includes space for two prior bankruptcy cases,
listing the location where they were filed, the case number and the date filed. If the debtor has more than
two prior cases, the debtor is instructed to 'attach additional sheet". Id. In addition, some local rules
require disclosure of all prior bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Petition Cover Sheet, required by
E.D. Mich. L.B.R. 1002-1(b); Statement of Related Cases, F 1015-2.1, required by C.D. Cal. L.B.R. 1015-2.
"'See, e.g., Edwards (listed two of three); Derrick Williams (listed none of three); In re Thomas, No. 1455799 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2014) (Kelvin Thomas) (listed one of two); Gibson (listed none of three);
Cartwright(listed two of four); In re Foster, No. 14-12020 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2014) (listed two of
four); Beale (listed one of two); In re Swafford, No. 14-01207 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2014) (listed none
of two); In re Manning; No. 14-08886 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014) (listed one of two); In re Greer, No.
14-10462 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 2014) (listed three of four); In re Vargas, No. 14-15481 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. Mar. 10, 2014) (listed none of two); Foreman (listed three of four); Shannon (listed none of three);
Calloway (listed two of three); In re Benjamin, No. 14-02338 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014) (listed none
of two); Chantres (listed two of three).
"'See, e.g., In re Shaffer, No. 14-00325 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Ziemer, No. 1410589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Pledger, No. 14-01150 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2014); In
re Williams, No. 14-01130 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2014) (James Williams); In re Hartsfield, No. 1411583 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Hoskins, No. 14-02299 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2014); In
re Ewing, No. 14-13524 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Fivecoat, No. 14-41172 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
Mar. 18, 2014); In re McLaren, No. 14-01178 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014); Greer;In re Foreman, No.
14-13732 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014); Vargas; In re Dillon, No. 14-11270 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. Mar. 7,
2014); In re Tribble, No. 14-13409 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Cota, No. 14-12823 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Catron, No. 14-10880 (Bankr. D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2014).
"'See In re Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014); c. In re Harris, No.14-41978
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014) (trustee mentioned number of prior cases in his objection; denial was by
docket entry rather than order). This is also true for cases not included in this study, see, e.g., In re
Castillo, No. 12-15265, 2012 WL 8441319 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 26, 2012); In re Davey, No. 11-11381
(Bankr. D.N.H. Apr. 8, 2011) (order filed June 30, 2011); In re Brown, No. 10-80454, 2010 WL 3491189
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2010); In re Massenburg, No. 10-35442 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2010) (order
filed Aug. 24, 2010); In re Nealen, 407 B.R. 194 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009); In re Boran, No. 07-42460, 2007
WL 7143412 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. Oct. 30, 2007); In re Jones, No. 06-51316, 2006 WL 3371791 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2006). But see In re Gatlin, No. 14-00242 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2014) (granting
motion of filer with two cases pending in prior year and three cases filed much earlier than the preceding
year); In re Washington, No. 12-80056, 2012 WL 602182 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2012) (granting
motion of debtor who filed five prior cases); In re Tripp, No. 11-02319 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2011)
(Order Allowing Debtors' Motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B) for Reimposition of the Automatic Stay as to All Creditors filed Apr. 21, 2011) (granting motion of filer with 'an additional five cases
within the preceding ten year period").
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does not limit how many times a debtor may file for relief.214
III. IS § 362(C)(4) EFFECTIVE OR NECESSARY?
All of my data leads inescapably to the conclusion that § 362(c)(4) is
neither effective nor necessary to accomplish the goals articulated by those
who supported its enactment.
This provision is not necessary because, even before the enactment of
§ 362(c)(4), the Bankruptcy Code contained provisions permitting bankruptcy courts to take action against a debtor who filed for bankruptcy under
circumstances that showed a lack of good faith. 215 Most courts concluded
that filing a bankruptcy petition in bad faith was "cause" for dismissal of the
case under § 1307(b), 2 16 § 707(a), 2 1 7 or § 11 12(b)(1). 2 18 The inclusion of
§ 362(c)(4) would make sense only if the standard for denying imposition of
the automatic stay was different from that for dismissal of the case for cause.
But, as discussed above, 2 1 9 most courts conclude that the same 'totality of
the circumstances" test for determining whether the case should be dismissed
for cause is applicable to rebutting the presumption under § 362(c)(4).
Indeed, the courts that were presented with § 362(c)(4) motions in the
2 14

An individual is not eligible for bankruptcy relief if that individual was a debtor in a case pending at
any time in the preceding 180 days if (1) that prior case was dismissed by the court for willful failure to
abide by court orders or to appear before the court in proper prosecution of the case, or (2) the debtor
voluntarily dismissed the prior case following the filing of a request for relief from the stay. 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(g). A debtor may not receive a discharge in a chapter 7 case if the debtor has been granted a
discharge in a prior chapter 7 or chapter 11 case commenced within eight years before the current case
was filed, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) or a discharge in a prior chapter 13 or chapter 12 case commenced within
six years before the current case was filed except in limited circumstances. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9). The
debtor may not receive a discharge in a chapter 13 case if the debtor has received a discharge in a chapter
7, 11 or 12 case filed within four years prior to the filing of the present case, or in a chapter 13 case filed
within two years prior to the fling of the present case. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f). Confirmation of a chapter 11
plan does not discharge a debtor if the debtor would be denied a discharge under § 707(a) if the case were
a chapter 7 case. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(3)(C).
15
See generally DeJarnatt, note 190 supra, 74 IND, L.J. at 481 (arguing that existing provisions of the
Code prior to the enactment of amendments to § 362(c) were sufficient to deal with abusive filers).
2 16
See, e.g., In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2007); Leavitt v. Soto (In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d

1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999); Molitor v. Eidson (In re Molitor), 76 F.3d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1998); Sullivan
v. Solimini (In re Sullivan), 326 B.R. 204, 211 (1st Cir. BAP 2005).
7

21 See, e.g., Piazza v. Neuterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 1253, 1262

(11th Cit. 2013); Perlin v. Hitachi Capital America Corp. (In re Perlin), 497 F.3d 364, 374 (3d Cit. 2007);
Industrial Ins. Servs. Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (6th Cir. 1991); McDow v. Smith,
295 B.R. 69, 75 (E.D. Va. 2003); but see Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir.
2000); Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding bad faith is not
cause for dismissal under § 707(a)).
21
8See, e.g., Cedar Shores Resort, Inc. v. Mueller (In re Cedar Shore Resort, Inc.), 235 F.3d 375, 379

(8th Cit. 2000); Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994); Rollex Corp. v.
Associated Materials, Inc. (In re Superior Siding & Window, Inc.), 14 F.3d 240, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1994);
Squires Motel, LLC v. Gance, 426 B.R. 29, 34 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
219

See part II(A)(1) supra.
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cases in this study have shown that they are perfectly willing to dismiss or
convert these cases under the provisions that predated § 362(c)(4). Of the
eleven cases in the study in which the court denied a motion to impose the
automatic stay, 2 20 ten were cases that were not filed under chapter 7,221 and
seven of those cases

(70%)222

were either dismissed for cause, 2 2 3 or converted

to chapter 7,224 prior to confirmation of a plan. Of the one hundred forty-one
chapter 13 or chapter 11 cases in which the court granted a motion to impose
the stay, fifty-seven were dismissed, 2 25 and two were converted to chapter
220

See In re Green, No. 14-41306 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2014) (Lydia Green); In re Ziemer, No.
14-10589 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Brown, No. 14-10217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014)
(Katina Brown); In re Epstein, No. 14-10269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Foster, No. 14-12020
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Harris, No.14-41978 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Garden,

.

No. 14-02057 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Payne, No. 14-10620 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13,
2014) (Darsheka Payne); In re Cota, No. 14-12823 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Allen, No. 1402484 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Benjamin, No. 14-02338 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2014)
21

2 Allen was filed as a chapter 7 case, and debtor obtained a discharge.
2
22 The three cases that were not subsequently dismissed or converted were Harris;Darsheka Payne;
and Cota. Debtor obtained confirmation of a chapter 13 plan in those cases.
223See Lydia Green; Ziemer; Katina Brown; Epstein; Foster; Benjamin.
4

22 See Garden. Cf. Allen (case was filed as a chapter 7 case). Debtor has not yet received a discharge
in Garden.
25
2 See In re Scullark, No. 14-23392 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Farris, No. 14-56451
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Lawrence, No. 14-56443 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014); In re
Phillips, No. 14-23398 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Hammad, No. 14-23414 (Bankr. W.D.

Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Patterson, No. 14-56594 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014) (Delana Patterson);

In re Egenolf, No. 14-12528 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014); In re Cox, No. 14-01757 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
Mar. 28, 2014); In re Dyson, No. 14-23296 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Moate, No. 14-

10410 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Horne, No. 14-23266 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014);
In re Robinson, No. 14-23280 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014); In re Anderson, No. 14-23198 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2014) (Toni Anderson); In re Palmer, No. 14-10598 (Bankr. D.N.H. Mar. 26, 2014);
In re Watson Cooper, No. 14-23188 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Broome, No. 14-23090

(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Good, No. 14-30957 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2014); In re
Smith, No. 14-23121 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Akitress Smith); In re Baker, No. 14-23118
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Demesma, No. 14-23120 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In

re Seaborn, No. 14-55914 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2014); In re Hartsfield, No. 14-11583 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. Mar. 21, 2014); In re Bailey, No. 14-22883 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Gibson, No. 1422995 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-23001 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014)
(Dorothy Davis); In re Pirtle, No. 14-22970 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Scales, No. 14-22910
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2014); In re Cartwright, No. 14-44541 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2014);
In re Thomas, No. 14-50669 (Bankr, M.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2014) (Willie Thomas); In re Vickers, No. 1409794 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2014); In re Kimbro, No. 14-22864 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014);
In re Worrell, No. 14-09428 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2014); In re Hardy, No. 14-22808 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 17, 2014); In re Davis, No. 14-22767 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (Sandra Davis); In re

Jefferson, No. 14-22707 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Peterson, No. 14-30779 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio Mar. 13, 2014); In re Hill, No. 14-22624 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Shondreaka Hill); In re
Greer, No. 14-10462 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 2014); In re Ivy, No. 14-22645 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
12, 2014); In re Jackson, No. 14-22638 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014); In re Thompson, No. 14-22442
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2014); In re Saulsberry, No. 14-22565 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2014); In re
McNeill, No. 14-01389 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Hall, No.14-10280 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar.
10, 2014); In re Powell; No. 14-08488 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Shannon, No. 14-41695
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7,226 prior to confirmation of a plan, representing 42% of those cases. Of the
remaining eighty-four cases in which the court granted a motion to impose a
stay, the court confirmed a plan in seventy-six cases (54% of the total pool).
However, eight of those cases were subsequently dismissed. 2 2 7 (As of June
12, 2015, no decision on confirmation had yet been made in the five remaining cases. 2 2 8 ) In six cases the court granted the motion to impose the stay
while a motion to dismiss was pending. 2 2 9 In other cases, the case was dismissed so quickly that the court did not render a decision on the pending
motion. 230 This data demonstrates that a large proportion of cases in which
courts grant § 362(c)(4) motions, and an even higher proportion of those
cases in which the courts deny such motions, are destined for dismissal or
conversion, within a very short period of time, regardless of whether relief is
granted under the new provision.
Section 362(c)(4) is also ineffective to discourage serial filings. As dis(Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2014); In re Johnson, No. 14-22489 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re
Brunson, No. 14-22467 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Branch, No. 14-22437 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Penirian, No. 14-43699 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2014); In -e Hardge, No. 1422471 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014); In re Tribble, No. 14-13409 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 6, 2014); In re
Ayers, No. 14-22380 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Grandberry, No. 14-22357 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014); In re Newton, No. 14-10830 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2014). in re Chantres, No.
14-15043 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. (Mar. 3, 2014).
6
22 See In re Shaffer, No. 14-00325 (Bankr. N.D.W.Va. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Green, No. 14-23283
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (Samantha Green). The debtors have not yet received a discharge. A
motion to convert is pending in In re Natividad, No. 14-51333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014).
mln re Anderson, No. 14-23381 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (April Anderson); In re Patterson, No. 14-23111 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Derrick Patterson); In re Smith, No. 14-23125
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014) (Dwight Smith); In re Bynum, No. 14-10688 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar.
21, 2014); In re Freeman, No. 14-11189 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014); In re Swafford, No. 14-01207
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2014); In re Jones, No. 14-22632 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014) (Kimberly
Jones); In re Williams, No. 14-00980 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2014) (Deborah Williams).
22
8See In re Natividad, No. 14-51333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Shaffer, No. 14-00325
(Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2014); In re Smoke, No. 14-51981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2014); In re
Dixon, No. 14-01694 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2014); In re Woods, No. 14-23093 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 24, 2014); In re Hoskins, No. 14-02299 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2014); In re McLaren, No. 1401178 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014); In re Hensley, No. 14-40729 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2014);
In re Catron, No. 14-10880 (Bankr. D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2014); In re Chantres, No. 14-15043 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
Mar. 3, 2014).
2 91n re Williams, No. 14-01130 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2014) (James Williams); Robinson; In re
Payne, No. 14-70476 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2014) (Bruce Payne); In re Peterson, No. 14-30779
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2014); In re Golden, No. 14-54566 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2014); Broome.
Three of those cases, James Williams, Bruce Payne and Golden, continued to confirmation of a plan. The
other three were dismissed.
230
See, e.g., In re McCann, No. 14-23226 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2014); In me Sykes, No. 1423084 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2014); In re McKinney, No. 14-22957 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 19,
2014); In re Ballesteros, No. 14-15033 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2014); In re Foster, No. 14-22716
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014); In re Armstrong, No. 14-22620 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014);
In re Earles, No. 14-22659 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014); In re Nelson, No. 14-54839 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Mar. 7, 2014). Cf In re Edmondson, No. 14-13616 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014) (court granted
motion on an interim basis and then dismissed the case before a final decision on the motion).
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cussed above, 2 3 1 the vast majority of debtors in the study who filed
§ 362(c)(4) motions had filed more than two prior bankruptcy cases, and
often many more than two. At least twenty-two of the debtors whose cases
were filed during the month of the study and were dismissed (35%) filed yet
another case before the end of the year, seventeen of them in the Western
District of Tennessee. 232 One debtor in the study filed two subsequent
cases, one under chapter 13 and then one under chapter 7.233 The debtors in
the twenty new chapter 13 cases 2 3 4 have all filed yet another motion to

)

impose the stay and the bankruptcy court has granted the motion in sixteen
of them,235 in one case three days after the case was dismissed.23 6 Of those
sixteen cases, ten have already been dismissed again.2 37 Two of the new
cases were dismissed so quickly that the court could not rule on the motion.2 38 (In one case the debtor withdrew the motion 239 and in one the
docket does not show an order with respect to the motion. 240
And yet serial debtors continue to file motions to impose the stay, creditors consistently fail to object to the motions,2 4' courts routinely grant these
23

'See part II(C)(8) supra.
See In re Vickers, No. 14-37141 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2014) (Vickers II); In re Kimberly N.
Jones, No. 14-30218 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Oct. 2, 2014) (Jones II); In re Derrick D. Patterson, No. 14-30018
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2014) (Patterson II); In re Good, No. 14-33314 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept. 18,
2014) (Good II); In re Powell, No. 14-33657 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014) (Powell II); In re Jefferson,
No. 14-29428 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2014) (Jefferson II); In re Saulsberry, No. 14-29102 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Sept. 3, 2014) (Saulsberry II); In re Toni Sherrie Anderson, No. 14-29137 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Sept. 3, 2014) (Toni Anderson II); In re Cox, No. 14-04873 (Bankr E.D.N.C. Aug. 25, 2014) (Cox II); In re
Broome, No. 14-28491 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 2014) Broome II); In re Ayers, No. 14-28017 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2014) (Ayers II); In re Gibson, No. 14-28031 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2014)
(Gibson II); In re Hardy, No. 14-28011 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2014) (Hardy II); In re Ivy, No. 1427945 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2014) (Ivy II); In re Scullark, No. 14-27754 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. July
30, 2014) (Scullark II); In re Peterson, No. 14-32515 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio July 15, 2014) (Peterson II); In re
Brunson, No. 14-26932 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. July 8, 2014) (Brunson II); In re Hardge, No. 14-26919 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. July 8, 2014) (Hardge II); In re Robinson, No. 14-26870 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. July 7, 2014)
(Robinson II); In re Dorothy M. Davis, No. 14-26297 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. June 19, 2014) (Dorothy Davis
II); In re Grandberry, No. 14-25605 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. June 2, 2014) (Grandberry II); In re Branch, No.
14-25245 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. May 20, 2014) (Branch II).
233In re Dorothy Marie Davis, No. 14-28542 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2014); Dorothy Davis II.
234
Two of the new cases were filed under chapter 7 and the debtor did not file a motion under
§ 362(c)(4). See Powell II; Cox II. One of those has already been dismissed. See Cox II.
235
Vickers II; Good II; Jefferson II; Saulsberry II; Toni Anderson II; Broome II; Ayers II; Gibson II
Hardy II; Ivy II; Scullark II; Brunson II; Hardge II; Dorothy Davis II; Grandberry II; Branch II.
... Dorothy Davis II.
2 7
Jefferson II; Saulsberry II; Broome II; Gibson II; Hardy II; Ivy II; Hardge II; Dorothy Davis II;
Grandberry II; Brach II. Three of those debtors have since filed yet another case. See In re Broome, No.
15-24472 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. May 18, 2015); In re Branch, No. 14-31680 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Nov 14,
2014); In re Davis, No. 14-28542 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Aug 19, 2014).
2
38Peterson II; Robinson II.
2 9
' Jones II.
2 40
patterson II.
1 4'There are several reasons why creditors may not object to the motions. The first is financial. They
232
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motions because they are not opposed, and the cases typically proceed to yet
another dismissal. Meanwhile there is lawyer time and debtor time and
court time devoted to this meaningless judicial dance focused on imposition of
the stay. Section 362(c)(4) has no benefit and significant costs. Its enactment was a mistake.

may not wish to incur the expense of retaining counsel to make an objection. Second, the creditors may
wish to give the debtor a chance to produce a confirmable plan that may pay them more in the long run
than immediate relief from the stay. Third, the creditors may recognize that they are unlikely to be
harmed by imposition of the stay because the case is likely to be dismissed within a relatively short time,
and if that does not happen, the creditors can always file a motion for relief from the stay in the future.
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APPENDIX 1
B-4001-1 (rev 10/1/12)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Southern District Of Indiana

)

In re:

)

[Name of Debtor(s)],

Case No. (xx-xxxxx)

)

Debtor(s).

MOTION TO (EXTEND OR IMPOSE) THE AUTOMATIC STAY
PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(3) ior (4)1
The debtor(s) respectfully request(s) that this Court (extend or impose) the automatic
stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(3) [or (4)], and in support thereof state(s):
1.

The debtor(s) filed this bankruptcy petition on (date).

2.

The debtor(s) previously filed bankruptcy, (case number), under
Chapter (#) on (date) and that case was dismissed on (date).
(if more than one prior filing in the past year) Debtor(s) also
previously filed another bankruptcy case, (case number), on (date),
and that case was dismissed on (date).

3.

The debtor(s) had no other pending bankruptcy cases in the
preceding one-year period.

4.

The debtor(s) did not have any prior case(s) dismissed in the past
year for any of the following reasons:
*
*
*

5.

(failure to file or amend other required documents without
substantial excuse),
(failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the
Court), or
(failure to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the
Court).

There has been a substantial change in the financial or personal
affairs of the debtor(s) since the dismissal of the last case, and the
debtor(s) believe(s) that this case will:
*
*

(If a Chapter 7) be concluded with a discharge; or
(If a Chapter 11 or 13) result in a confirmed plan that
will be fully performed.

I

STAY IMPOSED
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(Those changes are described in the attached affidavit.)
6.

(if applicable) At the time of the dismissal of the prior case, one or more
creditors had filed a Motion for Relief from Stay and such motion(s)
(was/were) pending or had been resolved by terminating, conditioning, or
limiting the stay as to actions by such creditor(s):
[List creditor(s) and statuses of any motions for relief here.]

7.

(if seeking to extend the stay) The automatic stay will terminate on (date)
without further order of this Court.

8.

[Discuss contact with creditor(s), if any, prior to filing the motion.]

WHEREFORE, the debtor(s) pray that this Court grant the Motion to (Extend or
Impose) the Automatic Stay as to all creditors (or identify creditors specifically), after
notice and opportunity to be heard, and for all other proper relief.

Is/ Counsel for Debtor(s)
Counsel for Debtor(s)
(required signature block)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
(See "Certificate of Service - Generic" on the Court's website under
"Forms/Local/Motions & Related Notices-Certificates of
Service-Orders/Certificates of Service/Generic.")
[Note: Attach Affidavit in Support of Motion to (Extend or Impose) Automatic
Stay.]

2
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Southern District Of Indiana
)

In re:
[Name of Debtor(s)],

)

Case No. (xx-xxxxx)

Debtor(s).

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO (EXTEND OR IMPOSE) THE
AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. 4362(c)(3) [or (4)
The debtor(s), in support of the Motion to (Extend or Impose) the Automatic Stay, state
as follows:
1.

(I/We) filed this bankruptcy petition on (date).

2.

(I/We) previously filed bankruptcy, (case number), under Chapter
(#) on (date) and that case was dismissed on (date).
(If more than one prior filing in the past year) (I/We) also
previously filed another bankruptcy case, (case number), on
(date), and that case was dismissed on (date).

3.

(I/We) have had no other pending bankruptcy cases in the
preceding one-year period.

4.

(I/We) have not had any prior case(s) dismissed in the past year for
any of the following reasons:
*
*
*

5.

(failure to file or amend other required documents without
substantial excuse),
(failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the
Court), or
(failure to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the
Court).

(I/We) have had a substantial change in (my/our) financial or
personal affairs since the dismissal of the last case, and (I/we)
believe that this case will:
*

(If a Chapter 7) be concluded with a discharge; or
3
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(If a Chapter 11 or 13) result in a confirmed plan that
will be fully performed.
Those changes are as follows:
(Describe in detail.)
(I/We) affirm under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of (my/our) information and belief.

Signature of Debtor

Signature of Joint Debtor

4
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APPENDIX 2
Attorney or Party Name, Address. Telephone &FAX Nos., State Bar No. &
Email Address

FOR COURT USE ONLY

[l Individual appearing without attorney
O Attorney for

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA -- SELECT DIVISIONIn re:

CASE NO.:

CHAPTER: SELECT CHAPTER

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN
INDIVIDUAL CASE FOR ORDER IMPOSING A
STAY OR CONTINUING THE AUTOMATIC
STAY AS THE COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE
(with supporting declarations)

Debtor(s).

DATE:
TIME:
COURTROOM:

Movant:
1. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN to
(Secured Creditor/Lessor),trustee (if any), and affected creditors (Responding Parties), their attorneys (if any), and
other interested parties that on the above date and time and in the stated courtroom, Movant in the above-captioned
matter will move this court for an order imposing a stay or continuing the automatic stay as to certain creditors and

actions described in the motion on the grounds set forth in the attached motion.
2.

Hearing Location:

]

255 East Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012
21041 Burbank Boulevard, Woodland Hills, CA 91367
3420 Twelfth Street, Riverside, CA 92501

O

a. This motion is being heard on REGULAR NOTICE pursuant to LBR 9013-1. If you wish to oppose this
motion, you must file a written response to this motion with the court and serve a copy of it upon the Movant's

0
0
3.

O
O

411 West Fourth Street, Santa Ana, CA 92701
1415 State Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Bankruptcy Cort for the Central District of Califomia.
December 2012
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attorney (or upon Movant, if the motion was filed by an unrepresented individual) at the address set forth
above no less than 14 days before the above hearing and appear at the hearing of this motion.

E

b. This motion is being heard on SHORTENED NOTICE. If you wish to oppose this motion, you must appear at
the hearing. Any written response or evidence must be filed and served: O at the hearing [O at least
days before the hearing.
(1)

O]

An Application for Order Setting Hearing on Shortened Notice was not required (according to the
calendaring procedures of the assigned judge).

(2)

E

An Application for Order Setting Hearing on Shortened Notice was filed per LBR 9075-1(b) and was
granted by the court and such motion and order has been or is being served upon appropriate
creditor(s) and trustee, if any.

(3)

O]

An Application for Order Setting Hearing on Shortened Notice has been filed and remains pending.
Once the court has ruled on that motion, you will be served with another notice or an order that will
specify the date, time and place of the hearing on the attached motion and the deadline for filing and
serving a written opposition to the motion.

4.

You may contact the Clerk's Office or use the court's website (www.cacb.uscourts.qov) to obtain a copy of an
approved court form for use in preparing your response (optional court form F 4001-1.RESPONSE), or you may
prepare your response using the format required by LBR 9004-1 and the Court Manual.

5. If you fail to file a written response to the motion or fail to appear at the hearing, the court may treat such failure as a
waiver of your right to oppose the Motion and may grant the requested relief.
Date:

Printed name of law firm (if applicable)

Printed name of individual Movant or attomey for Movant

Signature of individual Movant or attorney for Movant

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
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MOTION FOR ORDER IMPOSING A STAY OR CONTINUING THE AUTOMATIC STAY
AS THE COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE
Movant:
1. The Property or Debt at Issue:
a.
Movant moves for an order imposing a stay with respect to the following property (Property):
[ Vehicle (describe year, manufacturer, type, and model):
Vehicle Identification Number:
Location of vehicle (ifknown):
Equipment (describe manufacturer, type, and characteristics):
Serial number(s):
Location (if known):

O1

Other Personal Property (describe type, identifying information, and location):

O3

Real Property
Street Address:
Apt./Suite No.:
City, State, Zip Code:
Legal description or document recording number (include county of recording):

E

See attached continuation page

The following creditor(s) have a security interest or unexpired lease in this Property (give full name and address of
creditor)
now owed. (Secured Creditor/Lessor).
to secure the sum of approximately $
Additional creditors who are the subject of this motion, and their respective claims, addresses and collateral, are
described on the continuation sheets attached. (Attach additional sheets as necessary)

2.

b.

O

Movant moves for an order Imposing a stay with respect to any and all actions against the Debtor and the
estate taken concerning the debt/lease owed to the Secured Creditors/Lessors as described in this motion;
and/or

c.

Movant moves for an order Imposing a stay as to all creditors.

d.

O
O

a.

O

Movant moves for an order continuing the automatic stay as to all creditors.

Movant moves for an order continuing the automatic stay with respect to any and all actions against the
Debtor and the estate taken concerning the debtilease owed to the Secured CreditodLessor and/or

Case History:
a. OA voluntary O An involuntary petition concerning an individuals] under chapter
was filed concerning the present case on (specify date):
b.

O

An Order of Conversion to chapter

c.

El

Plan was confirmed on (specify date):

E

7

Ol 11 0

12

0

7 []11

0

12

] 13

El 13 was entered on (specify date):

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Banikuptcy Court for the Central District of California.
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d. Other bankruptcy cases filed by or against this Debtor have been pending within the past year preceding the
petition date in this case. These cases and the reasons for dismissal are:
1. Case name:
Case number:
Date filed:
Relief from stay re this Property
Reason for dismissal:

Chapter
Date dismissed:
Ol was Owas not granted

2. Case name:
Case number
Date filed:
Relief from stay re this Property
Reason for dismissal:

Chapter
Date dismissed:

LI was

Owas not granted

OSee attached continuation page
e.

O

As of the date of this motion the DebtorO has [ has not filed a statement of intentions regarding this
Property as required under 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2). If a statement of intentions has been filed, Debtor]has
performed as promised therein.

Ol has not
O

g.

O

and the court
The first date set for the meeting of creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) is/was
has O has not fixed a later date for performance by Debtor of the obligations described at 11 U.S.C.
§ 521 (a)(2). The extended date (if applicable) is

E

.

f.

in a previous case(s), as of the date of dismissal there was:
an action by the Secured Creditor/Lessor under 11 U.S.C.§ 362(d) still pending or
such action had been resolved by an order terminating, conditioning or limiting the stay as to such
creditor.

a) 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Property description/value:
Creditor/Lien amount:
Creditor/Lien amount:
Creditor/Lien amount:
Creditor/Lien amount:

b)

Property description/value:
Creditor/Lien amount:
Creditor/Lien amount:
Creditor/Lien amount:
Creditor/Lien amount:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ol

$

3. The equity in the property is calculated as follows:

Total Liens
Debtor's Homestead Exemption
Equity in the Property (subtract lines 6 and 7 from line 1 and enter here)

Total Liens
Debtor's Homestead Exemption
Equity in the Property (subtract lines 6 and 7 from line 1 and enter here)
See attached continuation page

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
December 2012
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4. Grounds for Continuing The Stay:
a.

Oi

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) the stay should be continued on the following grounds:

1.

E]

The present case was filed in good faith notwithstanding that a prior single or joint case filed by or against
the individual Debtor which was pending within the year preceding the petition date was dismissed,
because:
A.
B.

O
O

The prior dismissal was of a case not refiled under chapter 7 after dismissal under 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b);
Good faith is shown because

E
2.

E]

A.

E]

B.

E

The fair market value of the Property is greater than all liens on the Property as shown above in
paragraph 3 and as supported by declarations attached (describe separately as to each
property);
The Property is necessary to a reorganization for the following reasons:

E
C.

E

See attached continuation page

The Secured Creditor/Lessor's interest can be adequately protected by (describe Movant's
proposal for adequate protection):

E]
3.

See attached continuation page

The Property is of consequential value or benefit to the estate because:

See attached continuation page

The presumption of a bad faith filing under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C)(i) is overcome in this case as to all
creditors because:
A.
B.
C.

O

The prior dismissal was pursuant to the creation of a debt repayment plan. 11 U.S.C.§ 362(i);
Debtor's failure to file or amend the petition or other documents as required by the court or
Title 11 of the United States Code and resulting in dismissal was excusable because such failure
was caused by the negligence of Debtor's attorney;
Debtor's failure to file or amend the petition or other documents as required by the court or
Title 11 of the United States Code and resulting dismissal was excusable because:

Fl1

See attached continuation page

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
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Debtor's failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the court in the prior case is
excusable because:

E

See attached continuation page

Debtor's failure to perform the terms of a confirmed plan in the prior case is excusable because:

[]

See attached continuation page

There has been a substantial change in the personal or financial affairs of the Debtor since the
dismissal of the prior case(s) as follows:

From this, the court may conclude that this case, if a case under chapter 7, will result in a
discharge or, if under chapter 11 or 13, in a confirmed plan that will be fully performed.

E
G.

Oi

See attached continuation page

For the following additional reasons:

E)See attached continuation page
The presumption of a bad faith filing as to the Secured Creditor/Lessor under 11 U.S.C.§ 362(c)(3)(C)(ii)
is overcome in this case because

4.

O

See attached continuation page

5. Grounds for Imposing a Stay:
a. E] Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4) this case was filed in good faith and grounds exist for imposing a stay as
follows:
1.
The Property is of consequential value or benefit to the estate because the fair market value of the
Property is greater than all liens on the property as shown above in paragraph 3 and as supported by
declarations attached.

[]

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
December 2012
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E

The Property is of consequential value or benefit to the estate because the Property is necessary to a
reorganization for the following reasons:

E
3.

Ol
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See attached continuation page

The Secured Creditor/Lessor's interest can be adequately protected by (describe Movants proposal for
adequate protection):

E]

See attached continuation page

The present case was filed in good faith notwithstanding that the prior single or joint cases filed by or against
the individual Debtor pending within the year preceding the petition date were dismissed, because:

b. n
1

E

The prior dismissal was of a case not refiled under chapter 7 after dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b);

2.

El

Good faith is shown because:

El See attached continuation page
c.

E

The presumption of a bad faith filing under 11 U.S.C.§ 362(c)(4)(D)(i) is overcome in this case as to all
creditorsbecause:

1.

O

2.

El See attached continuation page
O Debtor's failure to file or amend the petition or other documents as required by the court or Title 11 of the

3.

O

Debtor had a substantial excuse in failing to file or amend the petition or other documents as required by
the court or Title 11 of the United States Code, resulting in the prior dismissal(s) as follows:

United States Code and resulting dismissal was as the result of the negligence of Debtor's attorney;

Debtor's failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the court in the prior case is excusable
because:

E]

See attached continuation page

This forn is rrandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
December 2012

Page 7

F 4001-1.IMPOSE.STAY.MOTION

223

STAY IMPOSED

2015)
4.

Ol

Debtor's failure to perform the terms of a confirmed plan in the prior case is excusable because:

E]
5.

O

See attached continuation page

There has been a substantial change in the personal or financial affairs of the Debtor since the dismissal
of the prior case(s) as follows:

(from which the court may conclude that this case, if a case under chapter 7, may be concluded with a
discharge or, if under chapter 11 or 13, with a confirmed plan that will be fully performed).

El
6.

O

7.

El

See attached continuation page

For the following additional reasons:

El

See attached continuation page

The presumption of bad faith as to the Secured Creditor/Lessor under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D)(ii) is
overcome in this case because

El

See attached continuation page(s)

6. Evidence in Support of Motion: (Important Note: Declaration(s) in supportof the Motion MUST be
attached hereto.)
a.

O

b.
c.

7.

Movant submits the attached Declaration(s) on the court's approved forms (if applicable) to provide evidence
in support of this Motion pursuant to LERs.
Other Declaration(s) are also attached in support of this Motion.
Movant requests that the court consider as admissions the statements made by Debtor under penalty of
perjury conceming Movant's claims and the Property set forth in Debtor's Schedules. Authenticated copies of
the relevant portions of the Schedules are attached as Exhibit
Other evidence (specify):

d.

O

El

An optional Memorandum of Points and Authorities is attached to this Motion.

WHEREFORE, Movant prays that this court issue an Order Imposing a Stay and granting the following (specily
forms of reliefrequested):
1.

El

That the Automatic Stay be continued in effect as to all creditors until further order of the court.

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Cental District of Calfornia.
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O That the Automatic Stay be continued in effect as to the Secured Creditor/Lessor with respect to the Property

until

further order of the court.

That the Automatic Stay be continued in effect as to the Secured Creditor/Lessor with respect to actions to collect
the debt owed to the Secured Creditor/Lessor until further order of the court.

3.
4.
5.

O That a Stay be imposed as to all creditors until further order of the court.
O That a Stay be imposed as to the Secured Creditor/Lessor with respect to the Property until further order of the
court.

6.

That a Stay be imposed as to the Secured Creditor/Lessor with respect to actions to collect the debt owed to the
Secured Creditor/Lessor until further order of the court.

7.

For adequate protection of the Secured Creditor/Lessor by (specify proposed adequate protection)

8.

O]

For other relief requested, see attached continuation page.
Respectfully submitted,

Date:

Movant name

Firm name of attorney for Movant (if applicable)

Signature
Printed name of individual Movant or Attorney for Movant

DECLARATION OF MOVANT
I,_
__
,am the
of Movant. I have read the foregoing motion consisting of
pages, and the attached materials incorporated
therein by reference. If reference is made to balances owing, my testimony regarding same is based upon the business
records of Movant kept in the ordinary course of business of Movant by persons whose responsibility it is to accurately
and faithfully record information as to the Debtor's account on or near the date of events recorded. I am one of the

custodians of such business records.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date

Printed name ofdeclarant

Signature

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
December 2012
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PROOF OF SERVICE OF DOCUMENT

Iam over the age of 18 and not a party to this bankruptcy case or adversary

proceeding. My business address is:

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN INDIVIDUAL CASE
FOR ORDER IMPOSING A STAY OR CONTINUING THE AUTOMATIC STAY AS THE COURT DEEMS
APPROPRIATE (with supporting declarations) will be served or was served (a) on the judge in chambers in the forrn
and manner required by LBR 5005-2(d); and (b) in the manner stated below:
1. TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (NEF): Pursuant to controlling General
Orders and LBR, the foregoing document will be served by the court via NEF and hyperlink to the document. On (date)
, I checked the CM/ECF docket for this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding and determined that the
_
_
following persons are on the Electronic Mail Notice List to receive NEF transmission at the email addresses stated below:

O

Service information continued on attached page

2. SERVED BY UNITED STATES MAIL:
, I served the following persons and/or entities at the last known addresses in this bankruptcy
On (date) _
case or adversary proceeding by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope in the United States mail,
first class, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows. Listing the judge here constitutes a declaration that mailing to the
judge will be completed no later than 24 hours after the document is filed.

O

Service information continued on attached page

3. SERVED BY PERSONAL DELIVERY, OVERNIGHT MAIL. FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION OR EMAIL (state method
, I served the
for each person or entity served): Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 5 and/or controlling LBR, on (date)
following persons and/or entities by personal delivery, overnight mail service, or (for those who consented in writing to
a declaration
here
constitutes
judge
the
such service method), by facsimile transmission and/or email as follows. Listing
that personal delivery on, or oversight mail to, the judge will be completed no later than 24 hours after the document is
filed.

Service information continued on attached page
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signature

Printed Name

Date

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
December 2012
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APPENDIX 3
PROCEDURES RE MOTIONS TO EXTENDIIMPOSE 11 USC 4362 AUTOMATIC STAY
PURSUANT TO 4362(c) or 4362(n)
1. Timing re Motions to Extend/Impose Automatic Stay Pursuant to

4362(c) or 4362(n):

a. Motion to Extend. A motion to extend the automatic stay pursuant to §362(c)(3) must be filed
within seven (7) days after the order for relief.
b. Motion to Impose. A motion to impose the stay pursuant to §362(c)(4) or §362(n)(2) must be filed
within thirty (30) days after the order for relief.
2. Content of Motion Filed Pursuant to 4362(c). The motion shall include the following information: (a)
the case number, date of filing, date of dismissal, and reason for dismissal of each of the debtor's
bankruptcy cases that were dismissed within the year prior to the filing of the current case; (b) specific
information as to why the moving party contends the current case was filed in good faith, (c) specific
identification of the applicable presumption(s) that the case Is not filed in good faith under
§362(c)(3)(C) or §362(c)(4)(D); and (d) the basis for moving party's contention that the presumptions
should be rebutted. The motion must be supported by an affidavit or declaration.
3. Content of Motion Filed Pursuant to 4362(n)(2). The motion shall Include the following information: (a)
the case number, date of filing, date and reason for dismissal (if applicable) of any prior bankruptcy
cases described in §362(n)(1)(A) - (D); (b) specific information as to why the moving party contends
that the filing of the petition resulted from circumstances beyond the control of the debtor not
foreseeable at the time the prior case was filed; and (c) specific information as to why the moving party
contends that it is more likely than not that the Court will confirm a feasible plan, but not a liquidating
plan, within a reasonable period of time. The motion must be supported by an affidavit or declaration.
4. Filing of Motion and Notice of Hearing. The moving party must timely file with the Clerk of the
Bankruptcy Court, and contemporaneously serve, both (a) a written Motion complying with the
requirements of ¶2 or ¶3 above, and (b) a fully completed Notice of Hearing using Local Form (LBF)
#721.5, including the date and time of the hearing obtained from, and following the instructions of, the
Court's website (under the Hearings heading, see Motion re: Imposing/Extending Sec. 362 Stay).
A. Unless electronically filed, file the Motion/Notice of Hearing in the Portland Office (1001 SW 5h
Ave. #700, Portland, OR 97204) if the 5-digit portion of the Case No. begins with "3" or "4", or the

Eugene Office (405 E 8" Ave. #2600, Eugene, OR 97401) if it begins with "6" or "7".
B. If you mail your documents to the Court for filing, you must mail them at least three (3) days before
any filing deadline, unless you use an overnight delivery service, so they will actually be received
at the Court on time.

5. Required Attendance at Hearing. The moving party must be present at the hearing. The moving party
may appear via telephone.
721.3 (7/18/13)
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

EBANKRUPTCY COURT
SOOTERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

FILED

SEP 2 0 2011
STANDING ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO
EXTEND OR IMPOSE THE AUTOMATIC STAY

DANNY L MILLER, CLERK
DEPUTY CLERK
BY

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the court may grant a motion to extend or impose the
automatic stay pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(B) or (c)(4)(B) ("the Motion") without conducting a
hearing subject to the following procedures:
1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, the debtor must file a Declarationin Support ofthe
Motion ("the Declaration") (forms attached hereto) as an attachment to the Motion.
2. The debtor must serve a copy of the Motion and Declaration on all parties against
whom the debtor seeks to continue or impose the stay within 2 days of the filing of
the Motion and Declaration and file a certificate of service with the clerk.
3. A motion to extend the automatic stay pursuant to
4 days after the date of the filing of the petition.

§ 362(c)(3)(B)

must be filed within

4. For a motion to extend the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(B), the court shall
set a hearing in accordance with Miss. Bankr. L. R. 4001 -1(e)(2).
5. For a motion to impose the automatic stay pursuant to

§ 362(c)(4)(B),

the court shall

not set a hearing with less than 14 days notice except under extraordinary
circumstances.

6. If a response or objection to the Motion is not timely filed, and the debtor has filed an
appropriate Declaration in support of the Motion, the court may grant the Motion
without conducting a hearing.
7. Nothing contained in this Standing Order shall change the provisions of Miss. Bankr.
L. R. 4001-1(e).
SO ORDERED. Effective:

_0_,

EDWARD ELLINGTA
UNI D STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

RINE M. SAMSON
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

2011.

NEIL P. OLACK
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTY JUDGE
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

In re:

Case No.:
Chapter

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND
THE AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. &362(c)(3)
The debtor[s], in support of the Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay, state as follows:
1. [I/We] have personal knowledge of the facts listed in the foregoing situation.
2. [I/We] [am/are] over the age of 18, of sound mind, [am/are]capable of making this
Declaration, and [am/are]fully competent to testify to the matters stated herein.
3. [I/We] filed this bankruptcy petition on [date].
4. [I/We] previously filed bankruptcy, [case number], under Chapter [#] on [date] and that
case was dismissed on [date].
5. [I/We] have had no other pending bankruptcy cases in the preceding one-year period.
6. [I/We] have not had any prior case[s] dismissed in the past year for any of the following
reasons:
* failure to file or amend the petition or other required documents without substantial
excuse;
* failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the Court; or
* failure to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the Court.
7. [I/We] have had a substantial change in [my/our] financial or personal affairs since the
dismissal of the last case, and [I/we] believe that this case will:
* [Ifa Chapter 7] be concluded with a discharge; or
* [If a Chapter 11 or 13] result in a confirmed plan that will be fully performed.
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8. Those changes are as follows:
[Describein detail].

Check the appropriate box:

F

If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions or commonwealths:
[I/We] declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

D

If executed outside the United States:
[I/We] declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that
the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on:

(date)

Debtor's Signature

(date)

Joint Debtor's Signature (ifapplicable)

Executed on:
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

In re:

Case No.:
Chapter

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO IMPOSE
THE AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. &362(c)(4)
The debtor[s], in support of the Motion to Impose the Automatic Stay, state as follows:
1. [I/We] have personal knowledge of the facts listed in the foregoing situation.
2. [I/We] [am/are] over the age of 18, of sound mind, [am/are] capable of making this
Declaration, and [am/are] fully competent to testify to the matters stated herein.
3. [I/We] filed this bankruptcy petition on [date].
4. [I/We] previously filed the following bankruptcy cases:
* [case number], under Chapter [#] on [date] dismissed on [date].
* [case number], under Chapter [#] on [date] dismissed on [date].
5. [I/We] have had no other pending bankruptcy cases in the preceding one-year period.
6. [I/We] have not had any prior case[s] dismissed in the past year for any of the following
reasons:
* failure to file or amend the petition or other required documents without substantial
excuse;
* failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the Court; or
* failure to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the Court.
7. [I/We] have had a substantial change in [my/our] financial or personal affairs since the
dismissal of the last case, and [I/we] believe that this case will:
* [Ifa Chapter 7] be concluded with a discharge; or
* [Ifa Chapter 11 or 13] result in a confirmed plan that will be fully performed.
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8. Those changes are as follows:
[Describe in detail].
Check the appropriate box:

D

If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions or commonwealths:
[I/We] declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

]

If executed outside the United States:
[I/We] declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that
the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on:
(date)

Debtor's Signature

(date)

Joint Debtor's Signature (if applicable)

Executed on:
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APPENDIX 5
UNITED STATES BANERUPECY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

STANDING ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO
EXTEND OR IMPOSE TE AUTOMATIC
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the cowt may grant a motion to extend or impose the
automatic stay pursuant to § 362(oX3XB) or (c)(4)(B) ("he Motion" without conducting a hearing
subject to the following procedures:

1.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, the debtor must file a Declarationin Aport ofthe
Motion ("the Declaration") (forms attached hereto) as an attachment to the Motion.

2.

The debtor must serve a copy of the Motion and Declaration on all parties apinst
whom the debtor seeks to continue or impose the stay within 2 days of the filing of
the Motion and Declaration and file a certificate of service with the clerk.

3.

A motion to extendthe automatic stay pursuant to§ 362(c)(3)(B) must be filed
within 4 days after the date of the filing of the petition.

4.

For a motion to extend the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(cX3)(B), the court shall
set a hearing in accordance with Miss. Bankr. L R. 4001- (e)(2).

S.

For a motion to impose the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(c)(4)(B), the court shall
not set a hearing with less than 14 days notice except under extraordinary
circumstances.

6.

If a response or objection to the Motion is not timely filed, and the debtor has fded
an appropriate Declaration in support ofthe Motion, the court may grant the Motion
without conducting a hearing.

7.

Nothingcontained inthis Standing Order shall change the provisions ofMiss. Bankr.
L. R. 4001-1(c).

SO ORDERED. Effective:

1

2011.

IIIM
DAVIDY HOUS
UITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDOB

Enteed9i!ftGfK
Northern Distcof Mass I

oavid J.Pu

lr cler

L

PRO
_

United SLs BankruPtCY Cou rt_

_

NEIL P. OLACK

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
In re:

Case No.:
Chapter
DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND
THE AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO II U.S.C. 6 362(c)(3)

The debtor[s], in support of the Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay, state as follows:
1.

[I/We] have personal knowledge of the facts listed in the foregoing situation.

2.

[I/We] [am/are] over the age of 18, of sound mind, [am/are]capable of making
this Declaration, and [am/are] fully competent to testify to the matters stated
herein.

3.

[I/We] filed this bankruptcy petition on (date].

4.

[I/We] previously filed bankruptcy, [case number], under Chapter [#] on [date]
and that case was dismissed on [dale].

5.

[1/We] have had no other pending bankruptcy cases in the preceding one-year
period.

6.

[I/We] have not had any prior case[s] dismissed in the past year for any of the
following reasons:
*
failure to file or amend the petition or other required documents without
substantial excuse;
*
failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the Court; or
*
failure to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the Court.

7.

[I/We] have had a substantial change in [my/our] financial or personal affairs since
the dismissal of the last case, and [IAve] believe that this case will:
*
*

[Ifa Chapter 7] be concluded with a discharge; or
[If a Chapter11 or 13] result in a confirmed plan that will be fully
performed.
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Those changes are as follows:
[Describe in detail].

Check the appropriate box:
O

If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions or commonwealths:
[I/We] declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

O

If executed outside the United States:
[I/We] declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on:
(date)

Debtor's Signature

(date)

Joint Debtor's Signature (i(applicable)

Executed on:

2015)

STAY IMPOSED

235

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
Case No.:

In re:

Chapter
DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO IMPOSE
THE AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. 6 362(c)(4)
The debtor[s], in support of the Motion to Impose the Automatic Stay, state as follows:
I.

[I/We] have personal knowledge of the facts listed in the foregoing situation.

2.

[IWe] [am/are] over the age of 18, of sound mind, [am/are] capable of making
this Declaration, and [am/are] fully competent to testify to the matters stated
herein.

3.

[I/We] filed this bankruptcy petition on [date].

4.

[I/We] previously filed the following bankruptcy cases:
*
[case number], under Chapter [#] on [date] dismissed on [date].
*
[case number], under Chapter [#] on [date] dismissed on [date].

5.

[I/We] have had no other pending bankruptcy cases in the preceding one-year
period.

6.

[I/We] have not had any prior case[s] dismissed in the past year for any of the
following reasons:
*
failure to file or amend the petition or other required documents without
substantial excuse;
*
failure to provide adequate protection as ordered by the Court; or
*
failure to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the Court.

7.

[I/We] have had a substantial change in [my/our] financial or personal affairs since
the dismissal of the last case, and [I/ve] believe that this case will:
*
*

[If a Chapter 7] be concluded with a discharge; or
[Ifya Chapter II or 13] result in a confirmed plan that will be fully
performed.
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Those changes are as follows:
[Describein detail.

Check the appropriate box:

O

If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions or commonwealths:
[I/We] declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

O

If executed outside the United States:
[IWe] declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on:
(date)

Debtor's Signature

(date)

Joint Debtor's Signature (ifapplicable)

Executed on:

2015)
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

In re:

Case No.:

[Debtor]

Chapter

NOTICE OF HEARING AND DEADLINES
, debtor, has filed a Motion to Extend or Impose the Automatic
Stay (the "Motion") (Dkt. #___) with the Court in the above-styled case.

The Court will hold a hearing on

,

at _

_.m. at

,

Your rights may be affected. You should read these papers carefully and discuss
them with your attorney, if you have one in this bankruptcy case. (If you do not have an
attorney, you might wish to consult one.)

Mississippi, to consider and act upon the Motion.
If you do not want the Court to grant the Motion, or if you want the Court to consider
your views on the Motion, you or your attorney must file a written response explaining your
position so that the Court receives it on or before

. Attorneys and Registered

Users of the Electronic Case Filing (ECF) system should file any response using ECF. Others
should file any response at the United States Bankruptcy Court, 703 Highway 145 North,
Aberdeen, Mississippi 39730. If you file a response, you or your attorney are required to attend
the hearing.
If you or your attorney do not take these steps, the Court may decide that you do not
oppose the Motion. If no response is filed, and the debtor has filed a declaration in support of the
motion, in accordance with the Standing Order Regarding Motion to Extend or Impose the
Automatic Stay, the Court may grant the Motion without conducting a hearing.

Dated:

David J. Puddister, Clerk of Court
United States Bankruptcy Court
703 Highway 145 North
Aberdeen, MS 39730
662-369-2596

Parties Noticed:

ALL CREDITORS AND PARTIES LISTED ON THE COURT'S MAILING MATRIX
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APPENDIX 6
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
*

IN RE:

*
*

Chapter 13 Case
Case No. 14-23266 D

Debtor(s).

*

*

EDIE HORNE

VERIFIED MOTION OF DEBTOR(S) TO IMPOSE AUTOMATIC
STAY UNDER SECTION 362(c)(3) AS TO ALL CREDITORS
Comes now the Chapter 13 Debtor, by and through counsel, and represent(s) to
the Court as follows:
That the Debtor(s) has/have had two or more prior pending cases
1.
dismissed within the last year because cause number 12-33442 filed 12/13/2012
dismissed 04/12/2013. Debtor states that she was in the hospital and was unable to make
her payments and therefore her case was dismissed. Cause number 13-29689 filed
09/10/2013 dismissed 11/15/2013. Debtor states that she was in the hospital on stroke
level and was unable to make her payments and therefore her case was dismissed.
That the Debtor(s)' financial or personal affairs have substantially changed
2.
since the dismissal of the prior cases and the Debtor(s) feel(s) that he/she/they can fund
and fully perform his/her/their plan because debtor is stable and out of the hospital.
Debtor receives SSI and assistance monthly. Debtor feels her income is sufficient to make
her payments.
That Paragraph 20 of Schedule J accompanying the Chapter 13 petition
3.
signed by the Debtor(s) provides:
$ 1476.00
Total projected monthly income
$ 1361.00
Total projected monthly expenses
115.00
$
Monthly net income
That the proposed plan payment is $ 100.00 monthly via direct pay from
4.
debtor and paid to the Chapter 13 Trustee.
That the Debtor(s)' prior Chapter 13 cases were not dismissed because the
5.
Debtor(s) failed to provide adequate protection ordered by the Court or after the
Debtor(s) failed to file or amend the petition or other documents as required by the
Bankruptcy Code or the Court without substantial excuse.
That Debtor(s)' prior Chapter 13 cases (choose one: were/were not)
6.
dismissed while an action under Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code was pending or
after such an action had been resolved with an order terminating, conditioning or limiting
the stay.
That this petition was filed in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed
7.
and the Debtor(s) believe(s) he/she/they can fully perform the terms of the proposed plan
should it be confirmed by this Honorable Court.
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Doc 7

Filed 03/27/14
Document

Entered 03/27/14 12:51:44
Page 2 of 2
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WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, your Debtor(s) move(s) this Court
under Section 362(c)(4) to impose the automatic stay under Section 362(a) as to all
creditors for the duration of this Chapter 13 case or until such time as the stay is
terminated, modified, or annulled under Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code or further
order of the Court.

Respectfully submitted,

By:

/s/Allen C. Jones
Attorney for Debtor(s)
314 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
Phone: (901) 522-9316

CERTIFICATION OF DEBTOR(S)
I/We, Debtor(s), declare under penalty of perjury that I/we have read the statements
contained in the foregoing Motion and that they are true and correct to the best of my/our
knowledge.

/s/ Edie Home
Debtor
Date: 03/27/2014

Debtor
Date:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that copies of this document were sent to the following by first class U.S. Mail
on March 27,2014.
/s/Allen C. Jones
Debtor(s)
Chapter 13 Trustee
All entities on matrix
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